Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses: A  Gallant Knight  Still Seeking Eldorado by Crystal, Nathan M & Giannoni-Crystal, Francesca
South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business
Volume 8 | Issue 2 Article 4
2012
Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses: A
"Gallant Knight" Still Seeking Eldorado
Nathan M. Crystal
Charleston School of Law
Francesca Giannoni-Crystal
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in South Carolina Journal of
International Law and Business by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Crystal, Nathan M. and Giannoni-Crystal, Francesca (2012) "Enforceability of Forum Selection Clauses: A "Gallant Knight" Still
Seeking Eldorado," South Carolina Journal of International Law and Business: Vol. 8 : Iss. 2 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/scjilb/vol8/iss2/4
 ENFORCEABILITY OF FORUM SELECTION 









*Distinguished Visiting Professor Charleston School of Law 
** Member of New York Bar and of Ordine degli Avvocati di Firenze 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Forum selection clauses (“FSC”) are very common in both 
domestic and international contracts.  In Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Company (“Bremen”),1 the Supreme Court established basic standards 
for the enforceability of such clauses.  Relying on Bremen standards, 
courts today generally enforce FSCs.  However, the vagueness of the 
Bremen standards leaves room for a party to resist enforcement.  The 
result may be delay and inefficiency.  The Supreme Court has said that 
an arbitration clause is a form of FSCs
2
, but it has applied different 
standards for the enforcement of arbitration clauses from FSC.
3
  This 
article argues for a reformulation of the Bremen standards in case of 
international commercial agreements, subjecting FSCs to the same 
standards that apply to arbitration in general.  Under this approach 
courts will discard vague concepts, such as “reasonableness” and 
“fairness,” and will restrict the public policy limitation to that 
                                                 
* Nathan Crystal has been teaching, writing, and consulting in the fields 
of contract law and professional ethics for more than forty years.  He is the 
author of four books and numerous articles on ethics and contract law, both 
domestic and international.  Professor Crystal has lectured internationally in 
Italy, Australia, and China. He is admitted to practice in South Carolina and 
Georgia. 
** Francesca Giannoni-Crystal is a dually-qualified U.S. and Italian 
attorney.  She is admitted as avvocato in Italy, as an attorney in New York, and 
certified as a foreign legal consultant in South Carolina (not a member of the 
South Carolina Bar).  Her practice has focused on transactional work, 
particularly international and technological contracts and corporate matters. 
The authors are the founding members of Crystal & Giannoni-Crystal, 
LLC. 
1   M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).  
2   Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).  
3   See infra pts. I at B, III at B. 
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applicable to ordinary contractual terms.  The analysis of the 
enforceability of a FSC should apply only to the FSC itself not the 
contract as a whole.
4
  This approach will both protect the reasonable 
expectations of the parties as reflected in their contract and will 
increase commercial and judicial efficiency. 
This article argues also for two other changes in the law regarding 
interpretation of FSCs: (1) A FSC should be interpreted according to 
the law of the chosen court.  This interpretation should apply not only 
when the parties have included a choice-of-law clause in their 
agreement but also when they have failed to do so. (2) In addition, as a 
matter of policy, a FSC should be interpreted as exclusive, unless the 
clause contains clear language to the contrary.  These interpretations 
reflect the majority view as expressed in international conventions on 
jurisdiction and arbitration,
5
 and, more importantly, they carry out the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.  
 This paper deals with FSCs in commercial international 
transactions.  We intend by “commercial” a transaction in which no 
natural person acting primarily for personal, family, or household 
purposes is a party.  Thus, this article does not apply to FSCs in 
consumer contracts.  We intend by “international,” a transaction that is 
not local.  A local transaction is a transaction in which all the parties 
are resident in the same country and their relationship and all other 
elements relevant to their dispute (other than the choice of the foreign 
court) are connected only with that country.
6
   
Part I of this paper discusses some basic concepts regarding FSCs 
and deals with the evolution of their enforceability before and after 
Bremen.  The section concludes by identifying a number of still-
unanswered questions.  Part II compares the treatment of these clauses 
in international treaties.  Part III draws a parallel with the treatment of 
arbitration clauses.  The discussion of the analogy between arbitration 
and FSCs lays the ground work for the argument that the enforceability 
standard for arbitration clauses and FSCs should be the same.  Part IV 
provides answers to the unsolved questions identified in Part I.  These 
answers are based on principles of freedom of contract, efficiency, 
                                                 
4   This is the “separability” doctrine applicable to arbitration clause.  See 
infra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.  
5   See infra pt. II.  
6   Hague Convention on Private International Law, Convention on Choice 
of Court Agreements art. 1, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294, available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf. See infra notes 142-85 and 
accompanying text.  
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historical development, and international uniformity. Part V is a short 
conclusion. 
 
I.  THE MEANING AND EVOLUTION IN THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 
FSCS  
A. The Meaning and Traditional View on the Enforcement of FSCs 
A FSC is a “contractual provision by which the parties establish 
the place (such as the country, state, or type of tribunal) for specified 
litigation between them.”7  A FSC has the function of consenting to the 
jurisdiction of the chosen forum.  In addition, the clause could bar 
litigation elsewhere.  A clause that does bar litigation elsewhere is 
sometimes referred to as an “exclusive” FSC.8  Historically, the 
prevailing approach in the U.S. was that exclusive FSCs were 
unenforceable because they violated public policy, namely they 
“ousted” courts of jurisdiction to decide the dispute.9   
The Supreme Court never decided a case adopting the old 
approach to FSCs.  The closest the Court came was in Carbon Black 
Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa.
10
  The holding is actually quite narrow; 
the decision is a dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted
11
 but 
being the only decision of the Supreme Court before Bremen, it is 
worth describing the case in some detail.  The facts are very similar to 
the facts of Bremen (see below): Carbon Black Export, Inc., a Delaware 
corporation, brought a libel in admiralty in a Texas federal district court 
for damages to a shipment of goods “during an ocean voyage from 
                                                 
7   BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 681 (8th ed. 2004). 
8   See Baker v. Impact Holding, Inc., No. 4960-VCP, 2010 WL 1931032 
(Del. Ch. May 13, 2010) (enforcing an exclusive FSC providing for suits only 
in state or federal court in Dallas, Texas). 
9   See, e.g., Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9 n.10 (citing cases following traditional 
approach); Mut. Reserve Fund Life Ins. Ass’n v. Cleveland Woolen Mills, 82 
F. 508 (6th Cir. 1897) (holding that a stipulation in a policy of life insurance 
that no suit in law or in equity shall be brought upon it except in the circuit 
court of the United States is contrary to public policy, and invalid).  
10  The Monrosa v. Carbon Black Exp., Inc., 359 U.S. 180 (1959). 
11  A short explanation for non-American readers: The Supreme Court, 
after having accepted a case for review, may decide against further review of 
the case when the justices feel that the case does not present the constitutional 
issues in a clear-cut way and they prefer to defer adjudication of these issues 
until a more suitable case comes before the Court.  Usually the Supreme Court 
takes such action with a per curiam opinion without explanation, but the Court 
did more in Carbon Black. 
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Houston and New Orleans to various Italian ports.”12  The libel was in 
rem against the ship, the S.S. Monrosa, “then in the port of Houston on 
another voyage,” and in personam against its owner, Navigazione Alta 
Italia (“NAI”), an Italian corporation.13  NAI moved the district court to 
decline jurisdiction because the parties had agreed, “in the bills of 
lading covering the shipment, that controversies in regard to cargo 
damages should be settled only in the courts of Genoa, Italy.”14  The 
clause in question read as follows:  
27. -- ALSO, that no legal proceedings may be 
brought against the Captain or Shipowners or their 
Agents in respect to any loss of or damage to any 
goods herein specified except in Genoa, it being 
understood and agreed that every other Tribunal in 
the place or places where the goods were shipped or 
landed is incompetent, not withstanding that the ship 
may be legally represented there.
15
 
The district court granted the motion, “subject to the filing of a bond by 
NAI in the sum of $100,000 to respond to whatever judgment might 
finally be rendered.”16  The court of appeals reversed, finding the 
provision in the bill of lading inapplicable to libels in rem and declining 
to enforce its terms as to the libel in personam.
17
   
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Brennan, 
dismissed the certiorari as improvidently granted.
18
  The Court agreed 
with the court of appeals and held that the clause above was 
inapplicable to libels in rem, and, accordingly, the libel in rem was 
properly maintainable.
19
  As for the action in personam presumably 
covered by the clause, the Supreme Court did not pass on it because the 
parties could nevertheless bring an action in rem in Texas.
20
  The 
Supreme Court, in other words, chose not to decide the extent to which 
effect can be given, in general, to stipulations in ocean bills of lading 
                                                 
12  Carbon Black, 359 U.S. at 181. 
13  Id.  
14  Id.  
15  Id. at 182. 
16  Id. at 181.  
17  Id.  
18  Id. at 183-84.  
19  Id. at 182-83.  
20  Id. at 184. 
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not to resort to the courts of the U.S.
21
  Justice Harlan in his dissent 
criticized the Court for refusing to decide this general point:  
“Avoidance of decision now on a question which is obviously bound to 
recur seems to me to be both unsatisfactory and unsound judicial 
administration.”22  
 While Carbon Black did not decide the question whether a FSC 
that deprives an American court of jurisdiction is enforceable, the 
interpretation that the Court gave to the clause in question (i.e., that it 
applied only to actions in rem while it could have been construed as 
applicable to both in personam and in rem claims) indicated the Court’s 
disfavor with FSCs.  Subsequent decisions seem to consider Carbon 
Black a precedent
23
 and indeed the Supreme Court in Bremen seems to 
refer to its Carbon Black decision as a precedent.
24
   
Also the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts (1971) adopted the 
traditional approach.  Section 80 (Limitations Imposed by Contract of 
Parties) states:  
The parties’ agreement as to the place of the action 
cannot oust a state of judicial jurisdiction, but such an 




In conclusion, even if the Supreme Court had never passed 
directly on the standards for enforceability of FSCs before Bremen, the 
prevailing view was that a FSC that deprived an American court of 
jurisdiction was unenforceable as such because it was contrary to the 
public policy that ousting jurisdiction was impermissible.  
If a FSC could not be interpreted as ousting an American court of 
jurisdiction, what was the value of such a clause before Bremen?  The 
comment to §80 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts, 1971 states:  
                                                 
21 Id. at 184 (“Resolution here of the extent to which these bill of lading 
provisions may be given effect by our courts can await a day when the issue is 
posed less abstractly.”).  
22 Id. at 185-86. 
23 See, e.g., In re Unterweser Reederei, Gmbh. 428 F.2d 888, 893 n.26 
(5th Cir. 1970) (referring to Carbon Black as precedent); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
N.V. Stoomvart-Maatschappij ‘Oostzee’, 201 F.Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1961).  
24 Bremen, 407 U.S. at 19 (referring to its decision in Carbon Black, the 
Supreme Court noted: “[T]he absolute aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon 
Black case have little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on future 
development of international commercial dealings by Americans.”).  
25 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS §80 (1971). 
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a. Rationale. Private individuals have no power to 
alter the rules of judicial jurisdiction. They may not 
by their contract oust a state of any jurisdiction it 
would otherwise possess. This does not mean that no 
weight should be accorded a provision in a contract 
that any action thereon shall be brought only in a 
particular state. Such a provision represents an 
attempt by the parties to insure that the action will be 
brought in a forum that is convenient for them. A 
court will naturally be reluctant to entertain an action 
if it considers itself to be an inappropriate forum. And 
the fact that the action is brought in a state other 
than that designated in the contract affords ground 
for holding that the forum is an inappropriate one 
and that the court in its discretion should refuse to 
entertain this action. Such a provision, however, will 
be disregarded if it is the result of overreaching or of 
the unfair use of unequal bargaining power or if the 
forum chosen by the parties would be a seriously 
inconvenient one for the trial of the particular action. 
On the other hand, the provision will be given effect, 
and the action dismissed, if to do so would be fair 




B. BREMEN V. ZAPATA OFF-SHORE CO.  AND CARNIVAL CRUISE 
LINES, INC. V. SHUTE 
Even before Bremen, the lower federal courts were showing an 
increasing willingness to enforce FSCs.
27
  The traditional approach was 
clearly overturned in 1972 when the Supreme Court decided Bremen v. 
Zapata Off-Shore Company.
28
   
                                                 
26 Id. §80, cmt. a (1971). 
27 See Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swed. Am. Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d 
Cir. 1955) (holding that enforcement of a clause in a bill of lading providing 
that all controversies arising thereunder would be under jurisdiction of court of 
carrier’s country, if not unreasonable, is not in contravention of public policy); 
Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F.Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (holding that exclusive 
FSC is not per se invalid but may be sustained if in light of surrounding 
circumstances it is reasonable); Aetna Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171 F. Supp. 
33 (D. P.R. 1959) (holding that parties to a contract may provide that all actions 
for breach shall be brought only in a certain court).  
28 Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.   
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Unterweser, a German corporation, entered into an agreement 
with Zapata, an American corporation, to tow Zapata’s drilling rig 
“Chaparral” from Louisiana to Italy, where Zapata had agreed to 
extract oil.  The contract between Zapata and Unterweser contained the 
following FSC: “Any dispute arising must be treated before the London 
Court of Justice.”29  The contract contained also two exculpatory 
clauses for the benefit of Unterweser.  While in international waters off 
the Gulf of Mexico, a storm surprised the flotilla and damaged the rig.  
Zapata asked Unterweser to transport the rig to Tampa.  Zapata then 
sued “in admiralty in the United States District Court at Tampa, 
seeking $3,500,000 damages against Unterweser in personam and the 
[ship] Bremen in rem, alleging negligent towage and breach of 
contract.”30  Unterweser moved to dismiss the action or in the 
alternative to stay the action pending decision of a London court in 
front of which they had in the meantime brought suit for breach of 
contract.   
The district court—relying on Carbon Black31—denied 
Unterweser’s motion to dismiss or stay Zapata’s action.32  The district 
court treated the motion as a motion for forum non conveniens and held 
that Unterweser had not satisfied its burden of proof to show that the 
balance of convenience was strongly in its favor.
33
  The court of 
appeals, also relying on Carbon Black, affirmed.
34
   
The Supreme Court held that in a freely negotiated agreement, 
FSCs “are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement 
is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’ under the 
circumstances.”35  This is the principle followed in England and other 
common law countries.
36
  As to this particular agreement, the Court 
held: 
The choice of that forum was made in an arm’s-
length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated 
businessmen, and absent some compelling and 
countervailing reason it should be honored by the 
                                                 
29  Id. at 2.  
30  Id. at 3-4.  
31  Carbon Black, 359 U.S. 180.  
32  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 6. 
33  Id.  
34  Id. at 7.  
35  Id. at 10.  
36  Id. at 11. 
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parties and enforced by the courts.
37
 
The Court stated that there were compelling reasons in support of its 
decision: 
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated 
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, 
undue influence, or overweening bargaining power as 
that involved here, should be given full effect.
38
  
The compelling reasons that the Court discussed are above all 
economic: the traditional disfavor towards FSC was—among other 
things—a hindrance to the international trade of American business.  In 
addition, the Court expressed further reasons that were specific to the 
contract before it:  (1) the fact that the contract was “a far from routine 
transaction between companies of two different nations contemplating 
the tow of an extremely costly piece of equipment” through the waters 
of many jurisdictions;
39
 (2) the fact that “the accident occurred in the 
Gulf of Mexico and the barge was towed to Tampa . . . were mere 
fortuities”;40 (3) the fact that the English forum was a neutral one and 
was chosen to eliminate uncertainty of forum since an accident could 
have happened anywhere;
41
 (4) the fact that the forum selection was 
negotiated between the parties and must have been taken into account 
in the acceptance of the economic terms.
42
   
The Court rejected the claim that Unterweser had to establish that 
London was a more convenient forum than Tampa.
43
  Rather the right 
approach, according to the court, was:  
[T]o enforce the forum clause specifically unless Zapata could 
clearly show that enforcement would be unreasonable and 




                                                 
37  Id. at 12.  
38  Id. at 12-13.  
39  Id. at 13.  
40  Id. 
41  Id.  
42 Id. at 14. (“There is strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital 
part of the agreement and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not 
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the 
consequences of the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.”).   
43  Id.  
44  Id. at 15. 
Whatever “inconvenience” Zapata would suffer by being forced to 
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Bremen does not stand for the proposition that FSCs should be 
absolutely enforceable between sophisticated entities.  The Court in 
fact places two limits to the enforcement of FSCs: (1) 
unreasonableness
45
 and (2) public policy.
46
  
As for unreasonableness, the Court does not clarify when a FSC 
would be unreasonable (this is one of the unanswered issues that we 
will consider below).  Without giving a comprehensive definition of 
unreasonableness, the Court specifies that (1) unreasonableness is very 
difficult to be found in an international private agreement entered into 
after “arm’s-length negotiations by experienced and sophisticated 
businessmen”;47 and (2) in an international agreement, inconvenience 
(even very serious inconvenience) to one party is not enough.
48
  When 
the agreement on a remote foreign forum is between two Americans for 
an essentially local dispute, “the serious inconvenience of the 
contractual forum to one or both of the parties might carry greater 
weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause.”49 
The uncertainty of the reasonableness standard is further 
demonstrated by the following quote:  
Of course, where it can be said with reasonable 
assurance that at the time they entered the contract, 
the parties to a freely negotiated private international 
commercial agreement contemplated the claimed 
inconvenience, it is difficult to see why any such 




                                                                                                 
litigate in the contractual forum as it agreed to do was clearly foreseeable 
at the time of contracting.  In such circumstances it should be incumbent 
on the party seeking to escape his contract to show that trial in the 
contractual forum will be so gravely difficult and inconvenient that he will 
for all practical purposes be deprived of his day in court.  Absent that, 
there is no basis for concluding that it would be unfair, unjust, or 
unreasonable to hold that party to his bargain.  Id. at 17-18.  
45  Id. at 17.   
46  Id. at 15.  
47  Id. at 10.  
48  Id. at 16-17. 
49  Id. at 17 (emphasis added).  
50  Id. at 16-17. 
[Between two Americans,] [t]he remoteness of the forum 
might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one, or 
that the parties did not have the particular controversy in 
mind when they made their agreement; yet even there the 
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Does it mean that even in a freely negotiated international 
commercial contract one party would be allowed to prove that the 
inconvenience was not contemplated by the parties at the time of the 
contract?  And what evidence would be sufficient to show the lack of 
negotiation of the issue?   
Coming to the prong of violation of public policy, the Court does 
not explain this limitation in detail either.  It only states that a FSC will 
be “unenforceable if enforcement would contravene a strong public 
policy of the forum in which suit is brought, whether declared by 
statute or by judicial decision.”51    
Determining when a FSC is unenforceable as contrary to public 
policy is an open question.  From Bremen two points are clear, 
however: (1) The ousting of the jurisdiction of an American court does 
not make a FSC unenforceable because of violation public policy.  The 
Court criticized exactly this “provincial attitude” followed in the past 
by American courts that was based on a concern about unfairness of the 
tribunals in other countries.
52
  Saying that a FSC ousts the jurisdiction 
of the court is a vestige of the past that is incompatible with the modern 
world.
53
  Indeed, the point is not so much whether the clause ousts a 
U.S. court of jurisdiction (it certainly does); what matters is the 
“expectation of the parties.”54 (2) In an entirely local controversy 
between two Americans, a FSC that would have the effect of avoiding 
the application of a mandatory law of particular strength would be 
unenforceable.
55
   
Nineteen years after Bremen, in Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v 
                                                                                                 
party claiming should bear a heavy burden of proof. Id. at 
17. 
51  Id. at 15. 
52  Id. at 12. 
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  The Court rejected the argument that the FSC in the contract between 
Zapata and Unterweser was unenforceable as having the result of allowing the 
avoidance of Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955). Id. at 15-
17.  According to the Court, Bisso was not applicable because it only applies to 
domestic waters and not to international waters.  Id.  The Court suggested, 
however, that had Bisso been applicable, the FSC might have been 
unenforceable as contrary to public policy.  Id. at 17.  See William M. 
Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection Clauses in Adhesion 
Contracts, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 977 (1992).  See also infra note 93 (discussing 
the Bisso doctrine). 
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 the Court expanded the enforceability of FSCs.  While in 
Bremen the Supreme Court upheld a FSC between two sophisticated 




Mr. and Ms. Shute, a couple resident in Washington State, 
purchased through a travel agent a seven day cruise on the ship 
“Tropicale” owned by Carnival Cruise.58  After the Shutes “paid the 
fare to the agent,” Carnival Cruise, in its headquarters in Miami, 
Florida, “prepared the tickets” and sent them to the Shutes.59  The 
following language was printed on the face of each ticket: “SUBJECT 
TO CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT ON LAST PAGES 
IMPORTANT! PLEASE READ CONTRACT--ON LAST PAGES 1, 
2, 3.”60 Page 1 contained the following conditions:  
“TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PASSAGE 
CONTRACT TICKET” 
                . . . .  
3. (a)  The acceptance of this ticket by the person 
or persons named hereon as passengers shall be 
deemed to be an acceptance and agreement by each 
of them of all of the terms and conditions of this 
passage Contract Ticket.   
 . . . .  
8. It is agreed by and between the passenger and the 
Carrier that all disputes and matters whatsoever 
arising under, in connection with or incident to this 
Contract shall be litigated, if at all, in and before a 
Court located in the State of Florida, U.S.A., to the 
                                                 
56  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
57  While FSCs in adhesion contracts are beyond the scope of this paper, 
Carnival Cruise has relevance to some of the issues raised in this paper.  In 
particular, the decision clarified that the enforceability of a FSC does not 
depend on negotiation and does not depend on the two parties being 
sophisticated.  The decision, as we will discuss below, however, introduces 
additional possible limitations on FSCs, i.e., burdensomeness and unfairness.  
See Richman, supra note 55. 
58  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587. 
59  Id.  
60  Id.  
214 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 




The Shutes boarded in Los Angeles.
62
  While the ship was in 
international waters off the Mexican coast, Ms. Shute slipped on the 
deck and received injuries.
63
  The Shutes brought an action in a 
Washington Federal District Court against Carnival Cruise.
64
  Carnival 
Cruise moved for a summary judgment based on the FSC or, 
alternatively, on lack of personal jurisdiction.
65
  The court granted the 
motion, holding that there was no personal jurisdiction over Carnival 
Cruise.
66
  The court of appeals reversed, finding that (1) the contacts 
between Carnival Cruise and the forum state (Washington) were 
enough to establish personal jurisdiction over Carnival Cruise and that 
(2) the FSC was unenforceable because “not freely bargained for” 
under the test of Bremen.
67
  
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals 
had “erred in refusing to enforce” the FSC.68  The Supreme Court 
stated that the court of appeals had wrongly applied a requirement that 
FSCs must be freely bargained for because the court ignored the 
difference between the contract involved in Bremen and the contract 
involved in Carnival Cruise.
69
  
The Bremen concerned a “far from routine 
transaction between companies of two different 
nations contemplating the tow of an extremely costly 
piece of equipment from Louisiana across the Gulf of 
Mexico and the Atlantic Ocean, through the 
Mediterranean Sea to its final destination in the 
Adriatic Sea.” . . .  These facts suggest that, even 
apart from the evidence of negotiation regarding the 
forum clause, it was entirely reasonable for the Court 
in The Bremen to have expected Unterweser and 
Zapata to have negotiated with care in selecting a 
                                                 
61  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 587-88.  
62  Id. at 585. 
63  Id. 
64  Id.  
65  Id. 
66  Id.  
67  Id. at 589-92 (“Alternatively, the Court of Appeals ruled that the clause 
should not be enforced because enforcement effectively would deprive 
respondents of an opportunity to litigate their claim against petitioner.”). 
68  Id. at 595.  
69  Id. at 592.  
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forum for the resolution of disputes arising from their 
special towing contract.  
In contrast, respondents’ passage contract was purely 
routine and doubtless nearly identical to every 
commercial passage contract issued by petitioner and 
most other cruise lines….  In this context, it would be 
entirely unreasonable for us to assume that 
respondents-or any other cruise passenger-would 
negotiate with petitioner the terms of a forum-




In Carnival Cruise the Supreme Court clarified the test of 
enforceability of FSCs: a FSC is enforceable if it is reasonable and 
reasonableness can exist even if the contract has not been negotiated at 
arm’s length between the parties.71  The Court gave several reasons for 
allowing the use of a FSC in an adhesion contract of this type:  (1) “a 
cruise line has a special interest in limiting the fora in which it 
potentially could be subject to suit” since its passengers come from so 
many different jurisdictions;
72
 (2) a FSC avoids confusion about where 
a lawsuit can be brought, thus “sparing litigants the time and expense of 
pretrial motions to determine the correct forum and conserving judicial 
resources that otherwise would be devoted to deciding those 
motions;”73 and (3) the passengers are likely to “benefit” in the form of 
reduced fares reflecting the savings that the cruise line enjoys by 
limiting the fora in which it may be sued.”74 
The Court specified that the enforceability of a FSC in an 
adhesion contract is “subject to judicial scrutiny for fundamental 
fairness.”75  The test for fairness is whether the selected forum was 
chosen in bad faith to discourage passengers from bringing legitimate 
claims.
76
  In Carnival Cruise there was no evidence that the forum 
(Florida) was chosen with that purpose.
77
 Carnival Cruise has: 
[I]ts principal place of business in Florida, and many 
of its cruises depart from and return to Florida ports.  
                                                 
70  Id. at 592-93 (internal citation omitted). 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. at 594. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 595. 
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
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Similarly, there is no evidence that petitioner 
obtained respondents’ accession to the forum clause 
by fraud or overreaching.  Finally, respondents have 
conceded that they were given notice of the forum 
provision and, therefore, presumably retained the 
option of rejecting the contract with impunity.
78
 
The Shutes failed to satisfy “a ‘heavy burden of proof’ . . . required to 
set aside the clause on grounds of inconvenience.”79  
While the limitations set forth in Carnival Cruise seem to provide 
protection for consumers, some courts have narrowly construed these 
limitations.  For example, in Seung v. Regent Seven Seas Cruises, 
Inc.,
80
 the Eleventh Circuit found reasonable a FSC that forced a U.S. 




C. UNSOLVED ISSUES AFTER BREMEN AND CARNIVAL CRUISE 
While today in the U.S. FSCs are generally enforceable,
82
 this 
                                                 
78  Id. 
79 Id. (quoting Bremen, 407 U.S. 1).  The Supreme Court rejected the 
ungrounded statement of the court of appeals “that the Shutes were physically 
and financially” unable to pursue their claim in Florida.  Id. at 594 (quoting 
Abramson v. Brownstein 897 F.2d 389, 389 (9th Cir. 1990).  The Court also 
held that Florida was not a remote forum and therefore, even if the contract in 
question was between two Americans, the FSC was not to be examined with 
more concern.  Id. 
80  Seung v. Regent Seven Seas Cruises, Inc., 393 F. App’x 647 (11th Cir. 
2010).   
81  The language of the FSC stated: 
For all cruises which do not include a port of the United 
States, it is agreed by and between the passengers and 
Owners that any and all disputes and matters whatsoever 
arising out of or in connection with this Ticket/Contract shall 
be litigated and determined, if at all, before a court of 
competent jurisdiction in Paris, France. 
Id. at 649.  As a matter of fact, “[Ms.] Seung’s cruise departed from 
Tahiti.” Id.  The ship “was to travel only within French Polynesia.”  Id.  Indeed, 
it never entered in American waters.  It only travelled in waters of French 
jurisdiction.  Id. at 651. 
82  See Walter H. Heiser, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court 
Agreements: The Impact on Forum Non Conveniens, Transfer of Venue, 
Removal, and Recognition of Judgments in United States Courts, 31 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 1013 (2010):  
The vast majority of courts in the United States will enforce a 
choice of court agreement . . .  unless the resisting party 
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result often does not come without a great deal of litigation.  Litigation 
is increased by a number of important questions that Bremen and 
Carnival Cruise left unanswered.  This section discusses the important 
questions that remain unclear.  
1. WHAT IS THE TEST FOR DETERMINING ENFORCEABILITY OF A FSCS? 
Bremen and Carnival Cruise discuss a number of principles and 
factors governing FSCs but the decisions fail to reduce these elements 
to a clear test.  Lower courts since these cases have tried to do so.  A 
typical statement is the following: 
Mandatory forum-selection clauses are 
“presumptively valid and enforceable” absent a 
“strong showing that enforcement would be unfair or 
unreasonable under the circumstances . . . . A forum-
selection clause will be invalidated when: (1) its 
formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) 
the plaintiff would be deprived of its day in court 
because of inconvenience or unfairness; (3) the 
chosen law would deprive the plaintiff of a remedy; 
or (4) enforcement of the clause would contravene 
public policy.”83 
Is this statement an accurate summary of Bremen and Carnival Cruise?  
Even if it is, this “test” is complex in application. 
2. WHEN ARE FSCS UNREASONABLE AND THEREFORE 
UNENFORCEABLE? 
While the fundamental test for enforceability of FSCs is 
“reasonableness,” unfortunately the Supreme Court has been quite 
frugal in the definition of this concept both in Bremen and in Carnival 
Cruise.  We do know that a party attacking a FSC on the ground of 
unreasonableness bears a heavy burden of proof.
84
  From Bremen, we 
know that the Supreme Court favors FSCs: FSCs are prima facie 
                                                                                                 
shows that enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust. . . 
. A few states treat forum selection clauses less favorably.  
Some impose additional prerequisites to enforcement, such as 
that there be a rational basis for the party’s forum choice; 
others flatly refuse to enforce forum selection clauses in 
certain cases. Id. at 1014-15.  
83  Slater v. Energy Serv. Group Int’l., Inc., 634 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 
2011) (quoting Krenkel v. Kerzner Int’l Hotels Ltd., 579 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  
84  Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.  
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enforceable, unless the resisting party shows that the enforcement 
would be “unreasonable under the circumstances”85 or “unreasonable 
and unjust.”86   
Both Bremen and Carnival Cruise cite a number of factors 
showing that the FSC in those cases were reasonable, but the factors are 
quite specific to the facts of those cases.  From the two cases it appears 
that the possibility of litigation in multiple jurisdictions is a strong 
factor supporting the enforcement of a FSC.  It also appears that the 
inconvenience of the chosen forum will not make the choice 
unreasonable, particularly if the inconvenience was contemplated by 
the parties, unless the dispute was essentially local and the clause called 
for resolution in a “remote alien forum”; even in this case the 
inconvenience would only “carry greater weight” in the analysis of 
reasonableness.
87
  In Carnival Cruise the Court referred to the 
possibility that a FSC might be unreasonable if it effectively deprives a 
party of his right to a day in court, but the Court found that concept 
inapplicable on the facts of the case.
88
  It also seems clear that lack of 
negotiation of a FSC is not determinative of whether the clause is 
unreasonable,
89
 nor is the fact that the parties are not business people.
90
   
3. WHEN WOULD A FSC VIOLATE A STRONG PUBLIC POLICY OF THE 
FORUM STATE? 
In both Bremen and Carnival Cruise the Court stated that a FSC 
is unenforceable if it violates a strong public policy of the forum state.  
                                                 
85  Id. at 10. 
86  Id. at 15. 
87  Id. at 17. 
88  Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 594-95 (1991). 
89  Id. at 585, 593.  In fact in Carnival Cruise the Court stated that it was 
entirely unreasonable to assume passengers to negotiate over the conditions of 
their tickets: 
Whereas it was entirely reasonable for Bremen Court to 
have expected the parties to have negotiated with care in 
selecting a forum for the resolution of disputes arising from 
their complicated international agreement, it would be 
entirely unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger 
would or could negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a 
routine commercial cruise ticket form. . . . . We do not 
adopt the Court of Appeals’ determination that a 
nonnegotiated forum selection clause in a form ticket 
contract is never enforceable simply because it is not the 
subject of bargaining. Id. at 585, 593.  
90  Id. at 592-93.  
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The Court also indicated that such a public policy can be reflected in 
either statutes or court decisions.  In both cases the Court rejected 
public policy claims.  In Bremen, the Court held that the Bisso
91
 
doctrine might be such a strong public policy, but the doctrine was 
inapplicable to the facts of the case because the doctrine only applies in 
domestic waters.
92
  More generally the Court spoke of violation of 
public policy when a totally local matter between two Americans calls 
for litigation in a foreign tribunal, and this has the effect of avoiding the 
application of an American law of particular strength.
93
  
In Carnival Cruise the Court rejected the claim that the FSC 
contained in a passenger ticket violated 46 U.S.C. §183c, which 
prohibits a vessel owner from inserting in a contract a provision that 
deprives a claimant of trial by a “court of competent jurisdiction.”94  
The Court found that the provision in the case did not deprive the 
plaintiffs of trial by a court of competent jurisdiction because it 
                                                 
91  Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).  According to 
the Bisso doctrine, exculpatory clauses in towing contracts in American waters 
are invalid as a matter of public policy, id.  See also Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. 
Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963) (per curiam) (following 
Bisso and declining to subject its rule governing towage contracts in American 
waters to indeterminate exceptions based on delicate analysis of the facts of 
each case). 
92  In the contract between Unterweser and Zapata there were two 
exculpatory clauses.  The Court did not decide the issue of enforceability for a 
violation of Bisso, since the accident happened in international waters:  
It is clear . . . . that whatever the proper scope of the policy expressed in 
Bisso, it does not reach this case.  Bisso rasted [sic] on considerations with 
respect to the towage business strictly in American waters, and those 
considerations are not controlling in an international commercial agreement.  
Bremen, 407 U.S. at 15-16.  
93  Had the contract been between two American companies with a FSC 
pointing to a foreign tribunal, the Court might have found the FSC 
unenforceable on public policy grounds: 
We are not here dealing with an agreement between two 
Americans to resolve their essentially local disputes in a remote 
alien forum. . . . . [The] selection of a remote forum to apply 
differing foreign law to an essentially American controversy 
might contravene an important public policy of the forum.  For 
example, so long as Bisso governs American courts with respect 
to the towage business in American waters, it would quite 
arguably be improper to permit an American tower to avoid that 
policy by providing a foreign forum for resolution of his disputes 
with an American towee. Id. at 17. 
94  Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595-96.  
220 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
required that suit be brought in Florida.
95
   
As anticipated, with regard to public policy, the only two points 
that are clear from the cases are: (1) Ousting a court of jurisdiction is 
not a strong public policy justifying invalidation of a FSC; and (2) Two 
Americans cannot use a FSC to avoid the application of a strong public 
policy law for their entirely local controversy.  
4. TO WHAT EXTENT IS A FSC SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY FOR FAIRNESS, 
AND IF SO WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS FOR UNFAIRNESS? 
 In Carnival Cruise the Court made clear that a FSC in a form 
passage contract is subject to scrutiny for fundamental fairness.
96
  The 
Court went on to state that a bad faith motive to deprive passengers 
from pursuing legitimate claims would amount to unfairness, although 
on the facts of the case the Court found no such motive.
97
  The Court 
also indicated that lack of notice of the FSC could be the basis of a 
claim of unfairness, but on the facts of the case the Court found that the 
plaintiffs had sufficient notice of the clause, a conclusion with which 
the dissent took strong disagreement.
98
  It is unclear, however, whether 
scrutiny for unfairness is limited to form passage contracts, or whether 
it applies to all form consumer contracts, or whether it applies to all 
form contracts (both consumer and commercial) because they are not 
negotiated.  In Bremen the Court referred in passing to fairness, but it 
did not use the concept in the case.
99
  It could be inferred that fairness 
analysis has no application in negotiated commercial contracts like the 
one involved in Bremen, but the issue was not squarely presented to the 
Court. 
5. IS A FSC SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY FOR OVERWHELMING BARGAINING 
POWER? 
 In Bremen the Court referred to this possibility although on the 
facts of the case there was no such discrepancy in bargaining power.
100
  
In Carnival Cruise there was a discrepancy in bargaining power and no 
negotiation, but the Court found that to be insufficient to invalidate the 
FSC in that case.
101
  It is possible that the Court meant by 
”overwhelming bargaining power” the inability to walk away from the 
                                                 
95  Id. at 596. 
96  Id. at 595. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 597-98. 
99  Bremen 407 U.S. at 18-19. 
100 Id. at 12. 
101 Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 593. 
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transaction; under that definition there was no overwhelming 
bargaining power in Carnival Cruise, but if so there would be few 
cases in which such a situation would exist. 
6. HOW IS A FSC TO BE INTERPRETED? 
There are several unsolved issues on interpretation.  Both Bremen 
and Carnival Cruise were admiralty cases; as such they were governed 
by federal law.  
The first unsolved question is whether the holding of Bremen 
should apply outside of admiralty cases.  In particular, does Bremen 
apply in diversity cases?  The answer is probably affirmative.  Even if 
the Supreme Court has not expressly passed on the point, in Justice 
Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp.,102 there 
is a statement that the holding of Bremen should apply also in diversity 
cases.
103
  Lower court decisions have held that enforcement of FSCs is 
a matter of procedure rather than substance.
104
  In Albemarle v. 
AstraZeneca
105
 the Fourth Circuit stated: “[W]hen a court is analyzing 
a forum selection clause, which changes the default venue rules 
applicable to the agreement, that court will apply federal law and in 
doing so, give effect to the parties’ agreement.”106  As a result, under 
Erie,
107
 also in diversity cases, federal law should apply to determine 
the enforceability of FSCs. 
However, even if we consider as settled that interpretation and 
enforcement of FSCs are governed by federal law, there is a second 
unsolved question on interpretation: What is the federal law on 
interpretation of FSCs?  The issue is important because a FSC can be 
narrowly or broadly construed.  If a FSC is construed as merely 
                                                 
102 Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 33 (1988).  
103 Id. at 33 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although our opinion in Bremen 
involved a Federal District Court sitting in admiralty, its reasoning applies with 
much force to federal courts sitting in diversity.” (internal citation omitted)). 
104 Wong v. PartyGaming Ltd, 589 F.3d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting 
that six circuits have held that “the enforceability of a forum selection clause 
implicates federal procedure and should therefore be governed by federal law,” 
and adopting that rule); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci America, Inc., 858 F.2d 
509, 513 (9th Cir. 1988). 
105 Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca U.K., Ltd., 628 F.3d 643 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
106 Id. at 650.  
107 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  For non-American 
readers: Erie is a fundamental legal doctrine of civil procedure mandating that a 
federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction must apply state substantive law, 
but federal procedural law. 
222 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
“permissive,” it operates as a consent to jurisdiction and does not bar 
the action elsewhere.  The “consent to jurisdiction function” is not 
without importance, of course.  Consent is one of the safest grounds for 
personal jurisdiction in the U.S. and, as far as we know, in many other 
countries.
108
  Much litigation on personal jurisdiction can be avoided if 
the parties consent to jurisdiction.  But obviously consent to 
jurisdiction does not solve the problem of possible proliferation of 
competent fora.  Indeed, if a FSC is interpreted as merely permissive, 
uncertainty remains because we do not know for sure where an action, 
if any, will be brought.  Only if a FSC is interpreted as “exclusive,” 
uncertainty is avoided because FSCs act both as a consent to 
jurisdiction and as a bar to litigation in any other forum.  
American courts have found dispositive the particular language of 
the clause and applied that language strictly: the courts do not go 
beyond the four corners of the clause.
109
  There is obviously no 
problem when parties make clear whether the clause is permissive or 
                                                 
108  Jurisdiction (“personal jurisdiction” in the US to distinguish it from 
“subject matter jurisdiction”) is the ability of a court to hear a case and to 
impose a binding decision on a person or legal entity.  There are many grounds 
for jurisdiction and every country has its own rules.  In Europe the main ground 
for jurisdiction is defendant’s domicile; in contract actions, place of 
performance is an alternative basis for jurisdiction (see Part II of this paper).  
American (personal) jurisdictional grounds are based on service of process (so 
called “tag jurisdiction”) and “minimum contacts,” as stated for the first time in 
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (holding, among other 
things, that minimum contacts with the forum state can enable a court of that 
state to exert personal jurisdiction over a party consistent with the Due Process 
clause of the American Constitution).  Obviously, the place in which a person 
has domicile, the place of performance of a contract, and (even more) the 
existence of minimum contacts, can trigger much litigation.  Consent to 
jurisdiction is a straightforward ground that can avoid this type of litigation.  
Indeed, there is no doubt that consent is an accepted basis for personal 
jurisdiction by American courts, both in the form of consent by agreement - and 
FSC is a form of express consent - and implied consent.  For express consent, 
see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) (holding, among other things, that 
personal jurisdiction is a defense; it must be raised and can be waived) and for 
implied consent, see Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927) (recognizing 
jurisdiction based on implied consent or waiver).  There is also no doubt that a 
similar principle applies in other countries.  See, e.g., Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 
218 (It.) (Reform of the Italian System of International Private Law).   
109  Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 650 (“When construing forum selection 
clauses, federal courts have found dispositive the particular language of the 
clause and whether it authorizes another forum as an alternative to the forum of 
the litigation or whether it makes the designated forum exclusive.”) (emphasis 
removed). 
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exclusive.  As always, however, a doctrine proves itself in dubious 
cases, i.e., in cases in which parties have not clearly expressed whether 
their FSC is permissive or exclusive.  The Supreme Court has not 
passed on the point.  Lower federal courts decisions have considered a 
FSC as permissive, absent specific language that makes the clause 
exclusive.
110
  In federal courts, simply put, the rule seems to be that an 
agreement conferring jurisdiction to one forum will not be interpreted 
as excluding jurisdiction elsewhere unless it contains specific language 
of exclusion. 
In addition, traditionally a FSC has been treated separately from a 
choice-of-law clause.  In other words, the interpretation of the FSC was 
based on the law of the forum, irrespective of the law that governed the 
substance of the agreement.  The result is that a FSC has been treated as 
permissive even if it would be interpreted as exclusive under the law 
that was chosen by the parties.  
The permissive approach - likely a remnant of the time in which 
exclusive FSCs were contrary to public policy as ousting the 
jurisdiction of American courts—clearly “reintroduces the very 
uncertainty that parties attempt to dispel by pre-selecting the law and 
forum for future disputes.”111  
 
II.  THE TREATMENT OF FSCS IN INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 
 In comparison to U.S. domestic law, the enforcement of FSCs by 
international documents is quite liberal.  We refer to the so called 
“Brussels Regime”112 and to the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements.
113
  The 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“New York 
                                                 
110  See e.g. IntraComm, Inc. v. Bajaj, 492 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2007) 
(holding that clause providing that either party “shall be free” to pursue its 
rights in a specified court did not preclude jurisdiction or venue in the forum 
court). Id. at 290.  See also John Boutari & Son, Wines and Spirits, S.A. v. 
Attiki Importers, Inc., 22 F.3d 51, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the clause 
“[a]ny dispute arising between the parties hereunder shall come within the 
jurisdiction of the competent Greek Courts, specifically of the Thessaloniki 
Courts,” was not an exclusive forum-selection). 
111  J. Zachary Courson, Yavuz v. 61 Mm, Ltd.: A New Federal Standard -- 
Applying Contracting Parties’ Choice of Law to the Analysis of Forum 
Selection Agreements, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 597, 597 (2008). 
112  See infra note 120. 
113  Hague Convention, supra note 6.  
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Arbitration Convention”)114 is also an example of a liberal approach 
with reference to arbitration (which is, after all, nothing but a FSC in 
which the “judge” is private).  We will discuss the New York 
Arbitration Convention in Part III of this paper. 
A. THE BRUSSELS REGIME 
The Brussels Regime is the system of rules that govern 
jurisdiction among the European countries in civil and commercial 
disputes between individuals and entities resident in member states of 
the European Union (“E.U.”) and of the European Free Trade 
Association (“EFTA”).115  Based on the traditional European approach 
on jurisdictional matters, the focus of rules of the Brussels Regime is 
on a defendant’s domicile. 
The Brussels Regime consists of three documents: the 
Convention of September 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels 
Convention”),116 the Convention of September 16, 1988, on 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, as revised by the Convention signed on October 30, 2007 
                                                 
114  See The New York Convention – Authentic Texts and Translations, 
NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION (last visited May 7, 2011), 
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-convention/new-york-conventio 
n-texts, for the authentic texts of the New York Arbitration Convention.  
115  While it is unnecessary to explain what the EU is, for non-European 
readers EFTA is an intergovernmental organization set up for the promotion of 
free trade and economic integration to the benefit of its four Member States 
(Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland).  EFTA manages the 
Agreement on the European Economic Area (“EEA Agreement”).  The EEA 
Agreement—entered into force on January 1, 1994—brings together the 27 EU 
Members and three of the four EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, and 
Norway) in a single internal market.  Switzerland is not part of the EEA 
Agreement, but has a bilateral agreement with the EU.  See generally THE EUR. 
FREE TRADE ASS’N, http://www.efta.int (last visited Feb. 6, 2011), for further 
information.  
116  Also called “EEX”, it was agreed between the countries of EU at the 
time.  The countries that are bound by the Brussels Convention are: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, United Kingdom, 
Gibraltar, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland (updated 2007).  For the text of the 
Brussels Convention see Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 1968, LEX 
MERCATORIA, http://www.jus.uio.no/lm/brussels.jurisdiction.and.enforcement. 
of.judgments.in.civil.and.commercial.matters.convention.1968/doc.html (last 
visited April 8, 2011). 
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(“Lugano Convention”),117 and the EC/Council Regulation No. 44/2001 
of December 22, 2000 on Jurisdiction and Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (“Brussels 
I Regulation”).118 
The rules of the three documents are very similar (that is why we 
simply speak of  “Brussels Regime”) but not identical because while 
the Brussels Convention and the Brussels I Regulation are subject to 
the interpretation of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),119 the 
Lugano Convention is not.
120
  
                                                 
117  Also called “EVEX”, it was agreed between EU and the countries of 
EFTA (except Lichtenstein).  It has been practically replaced by the so called 
“revised Lugano Convention” signed on October 30, 2007, between the EU, 
Denmark, and the countries of EFTA (except Lichtenstein) with the purpose of 
making uniform the rules of the Lugano Convention and the EC/Council 
Regulation N.44/2001.  The 1988 Lugano Convention still applies when 
dealing with Iceland, since in that country the Lugano Convention 2007 has not 
yet entered into force.  For the text of the revised Lugano Convention 2007, see 
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments 
in Civil and Commercial Matters – Protocol 1 on Certain Questions of 
Jurisdiction, Procedure and Enforcement – Protocol 2 on the Uniform 
Interpretation of the Convention and on the Standing Committee, EUR-LEX, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:22007A1221 
%2803%29:EN:NOT (last visited Apr. 8, 2011).  For more information about 
the revised Lugano Convention 2007, see Lugano Convention 2007, FEDERAL 
OFFICE OF JUSTICE, http://www.bj.admin.ch/content/bj/en/home/themen/ 
wirtschaft/ internationales_privatrecht/lugue2007.html (last visited Apr. 8, 
2011). 
118  Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 
1, pmbl. [hereinafter “Brussels I Regulation”].  The text of Brussels I 
Regulation is available online.  See Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 
EUR-LEX (Feb. 6, 2012, 9:55 PM), http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001R0044:EN:NOT.  
119  To show how significant the interpretation by the ECJ of the Brussels I 
Regulation and the Brussels Regulation can be see, e.g., Case C-386/05, Color 
Drack GmbH v. Lexx Int’l Vertriebs GmbH, 2007 E.C.R. I-5463 (deciding the 
meaning of “place of performance of the contractual obligation” under Article 
5(1)(b)), and Case C-539/03 Roche Nederland V & Others v. Frederick Primus 
& Milton Goldenberg, 2006 E.C.R. I-6535 (holding that in an action against a 
plurality of defendants for infringement of a European patent committed in a 
number of Contracting States, jurisdiction lies in the courts of the place where 
one of the defendants is domiciled.).   
120  With regard to the Lugano Convention decisions of the ECJ are only 
persuasive.  
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The Brussels I Regulation binds the E.U. members and applies 
inside the boundary of those countries.
121
  The Brussels I Regulation 
also applies to some of the territories of member states located outside 
of Europe
122
 and generally to countries for whose external relations 
some of the E.U. members are responsible.
123
  The Brussels Convention 
and the Lugano Convention apply when a defendant is domiciled in one 
of the contracting parties (or in their territories).
124
  But since many of 
the Brussels Convention’s contracting parties are now also E.U. 
members, the Brussels I Regulation has largely, if not totally 
superseded the Brussels Convention. 
The purpose of the entire Brussels Regime is to obtain 
predictability in jurisdiction and to avoid the proliferation of alternative 
fora.  The Brussels I Regulation states: 
The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable 
and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is 
generally based on the defendant’s domicile and 
jurisdiction must always be available on this ground 
save in a few well-defined situations in which the 
subject-matter of the litigation or the autonomy of the 
parties warrants a different linking factor. The 
domicile of a legal person must be defined 
autonomously so as to make the common rules more 
transparent and avoid conflicts of jurisdiction.
125
  
The basic rule on jurisdiction is contained in Article 2 of each of 
the three documents. Each Article 2 provides that a person (and the 
term includes entities), independently from his or her nationality, may 
only be sued in the state in which the person is domiciled.  In a 
contractual matter, the person can also be sued where the contractual 
obligation must be performed.
126
  
                                                 
121  There are exceptions.  For example, while Greek Cyprus is subject to 
the Brussels I Regulation, the non Greek Cyprus is not.  
122  For a detailed explanation of the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation, see BRUSSELS I REGULATION 24-30 (Ulrich Magnus & Peter 
Mankowski eds., 2007).  
123  There are exceptions.  See id. 
124  Not all contracting parties have agreed to apply the Convention to their 
entire territory.  For example, while Denmark is bound by the Brussels 
Convention, its territories of Greenland and Faroe Islands are not.  
125  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, pmbl.  
126  See, e.g., id. art. 5. 
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Notwithstanding the importance of the concept of “domicile” in 
the Brussels Regime, none of the three documents gives a definition of 
this concept.
127
  The three documents, in a similar manner, simply refer 
to the internal laws of the several states (see Article 59 for the Brussels 
I Regulation, Article 52 for the Brussels Convention, and Article 59 for 
the Lugano Convention).  For example Article 59 of the Brussels I 
Regulation provides: 
1. In order to determine whether a party is domiciled 
in the Member State whose courts are seised of a 
matter, the court shall apply its internal law. 
2. If a party is not domiciled in the Member State 
whose courts are seised of the matter, then, in order 
to determine whether the party is domiciled in 
another Member State, the court shall apply the law 
of that Member State.
128
 
The Brussels Regime, however, defines “domicile” for companies.  
See, for example, Article 60 of the Brussels I Regulation that provides: 
1. For the purposes of this Regulation, a company or 
other legal person or association of natural or legal 
persons is domiciled at the place where it has its: 
(a)  statutory seat, or 
(b)  central administration, or 
(c)  principal place of business.
129
 
                                                 
127  See generally The Brussels I Regulation, BRECHT’S DUTCH CIVIL LAW 
(Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/ 
brusselsone011.htm (explaining that the regulation is based on domicile and not 
residence).  Contrary to various International Conventions, particularly those 
drawn up within the framework of the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, and contrary to Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning 
jurisdiction and the recognition and the enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (‘the Brussels II 
Regulation’), the Brussels I Regulation does not link the question of 
jurisdiction to the habitual residence of the defendant (or plaintiff), but solely to 
his domicile.  
128  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 59.  
129  Id. art. 60.  Article 60 of the revised Lugano Convention 2007 is 
identical, while Article 52 of the Brussels Convention is partially different 
(“For the purposes of this Convention, the seat of a company or other legal 
person or association of natural or legal persons shall be treated as its domicile.  
However in order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of 
private international law.”).  Id.  
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The definition does not solve entirely the problem, however, because 
“statutory seat” is not defined.130 
The Brussels Regime covers only legal disputes of a civil or 
commercial nature.
131
  Disputes of family law, bankruptcy or 




The Brussels Regime is liberal on the enforcement of FSCs.  
Article 23 of the Brussels I Regulation provides: 
If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a 
Member State, have agreed that a court or the courts 
of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle 
any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in 
connection with a particular legal relationship, that 
court or those courts shall have jurisdiction.
133
  
Under the Brussels Regime, FSCs are interpreted as “exclusive,” 
not as “permissive”.134 Article 23 specifies that “Such jurisdiction shall 
be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise.”135  As one 
author has argued: 
An agreement which complies with the requirements 
of Article 23 shall create exclusive jurisdiction unless 
the agreement provides otherwise.  The European 
Court of Justice has persisted to view the forum 
                                                 
130 The Brussels I Regulation, BRECHT’S DUTCH CIVIL LAW, 
http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/content/brusselsone011.htm (last visited May 6, 
2011).  (“[The Brussels I Regulation] . . . . does not define what is meant by the 
seat of a legal person or of a company or association of natural or legal persons.  
In determining the location of the seat, the seised court has to apply its own 
rules of private international law.  Therefore, article 60 refers to domestic rules 
of private international law with regard to the statutory seat of legal persons of 
the State of the court hearing the case.  This may cause difficulties, because it’s 
possible that the statutory seat, according to domestic private international law, 
is not located in any Member State or not in a State where the legal person 
maintains property or has its head office.  For this reason, two alternatives have 
been added: the place of the legal person’s central management or, as another 
option, the principal place of its business, so that a legal person may be linked 
as well to a Member State on the basis of factual elements.”).  Id.  
131  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 1. 
132  Id.  
133  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 23.  
134  Id.  
135  Id.  
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selection clause, which was subject to consensus 
between the parties and which is included in an 
agreement in writing, as truly consensual and 
therefore enforceable and valid.
136
 
FSCs under the Brussels Regime must be in writing “or 
evidenced in writing,” or according to the course of dealing between 
the parties or “in international trade or commerce, in a form which 
accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been 
aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the 
particular trade or commerce concerned.”137 
If the defendant is not domiciled in one of the E.U. countries (or 
in Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland), or if the dispute is one of those 
that are excluded, then the Brussels Regime does not apply; instead, the 
domestic conflict of laws rules of the several European states apply.
138
  
The domestic laws of many of the European countries, however, have 
also a very liberal attitude towards FSC.
139
  
B. THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (“Hague 
Convention”)140 was concluded on June 30, 2005, under the Hague 
                                                 
136  Igor Volner, Forum Selection Clauses: Different Regulations from the 
Perspective of Cruise Ship Passengers, 8 EUR. J.L. REFORM 439, 462 (2006) 
(Neth.), available at http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/Volner_prot.pdf.  
137  Brussels I Regulation, supra note 118, art. 23.  
138  Id. art. 4 (“If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the 
jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Articles 22 
and 23, be determined by the law of that Member State.”). 
139  E.g., Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218 (It.) (“Consent and waiver of 
jurisdiction.  1. When there is no [Italian] jurisdiction, the latter also exists if 
the parties have consented to it through an agreement and the consent is proved 
in writing, or the defendant appears in the proceeding without objecting to the 
lack of jurisdiction in his first pleading.  2. The Italian jurisdiction can be 
waived by agreement for a foreign court or a foreign arbitrator if the waiver is 
proved in writing and the lawsuit concerns a waivable right.  3. The waiver is 
ineffective if the foreign judge or foreign arbitrators that have been indicated 
(by the parties) refuse the jurisdiction or anyway cannot decide the lawsuit.” 
(unofficial translation made by authors)). 
140  Hague Convention, supra note 6.  For a clear explanation of the Hague 
Convention, see Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, EUROPA, 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/judicial_coop
eration_in_civil_matters/jl0026_en.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2011).       
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Conference on Private International Law.
141
  It is an open convention, 
i.e. “is open for signature by all States.” (Article 27(1)).142 
Because of its importance, the Hague Convention has been 
characterized as “the counterpart for litigation of the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards.”143  Mexico accessed to the Convention on September 26, 
2007.
144
  On January 19, 2009, the United States became the first 
country to sign the Convention after Mexico’s accession; the European 
Union signed on April 1, 2009.
145
  Even if the Convention is not yet in 
force,
146
 the signature by the U.S. and the E.U. obviously demonstrates 
approval of its principles.
147
  
                                                 
141  The Hague Conference on Private International Law is an international 
intergovernmental organization that has the purpose to work for the progressive 
unification of the rules of private international law in the participating 
countries.  The Convention has 72 members.  For a list of members, see 
Members, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012), 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=states.listing.  The United States has 
been a member since October 15 1964, while the European Union accessed the 
Conference in October 2006 (but many of the EU countries were already 
members since the fifties and sixties). 
142  Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 27. 
143 James Spigelman, The Hague Choice of Court Convention and 
International Commercial Litigation, 9 JUD. REV. 389 (2010) (N.S.W.) (Austl.). 
144 See Status Table, HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2010), http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid 
=98#legend. 
145 Id.  
146 According to Article 31, the Hague Convention is effective once two 
countries consent.  Indeed the Hague Convention will enter into force “on the 
first day of the month following the expiration of three months after the deposit 
of the second instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
referred to in Article 27.”  See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 31, para. 1.  
Under Article 27 a country may sign the Convention, but the Convention is 
subject to ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession by the signatory 
states. Id. art. 27, para. 2.  Since Mexico is the only country to have ratified the 
Hague Convention, the Convention has not gone into force.  
147  The signature is very significant because, as it has been accurately 
noted, “[C]ourts, unlike commercial arbitrators, are regarded as manifestations 
of national sovereignty which governments are reluctant to compromise, even 
in the promotion of economic growth.”  Spigelman, supra note 143, at 2.  The 
signature demonstrates a change in this attitude.  
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The aim of the Hague Convention is to make “choice of court 
agreements as effective as possible.”148  As the Chief Justice of New 
South Wales of Australia has said: 
Ratification of the Hague Choice of Court 
Convention can make a contribution to reducing the 
transaction costs and uncertainties associated with the 
enforcement of legal rights and obligations in 
international trade and investment.”149 
The Hague Convention governs the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in international disputes arising from commercial 
transactions to which exclusive choice-of-court agreements apply.
150
  
Even if this might sound restrictive, we should consider that the 
definition of “international” under the Hague Convention is quite wide: 
A case is “international” unless the parties are resident in the same 
contracting state and “the relationship of the parties and all other 
elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the 
chosen court, are connected only with that State.”151  A case is also 
“international” when a party seeks the recognition or enforcement of a 
foreign judgment.
152
  In addition, the Hague Convention, like the 
                                                 
148  Trevor Hartley &Masato Dogauchi, Explanatory Report, HAGUE 
CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW at 21, para. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Explanatory Report], http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf.  
(“1. The aim.  If the Convention is to attain its aim of making choice of court 
agreements as effective as possible, it has to ensure three things.  Firstly, the 
chosen court must hear the case when proceedings are brought before it; 
secondly, any other court before which proceedings are brought must refuse to 
hear them; and thirdly, the judgment of the chosen court must be recognized 
and enforced.  These three obligations have been incorporated into the 
Convention, where they constitute its key provisions.  The hope is that the 
Convention will do for choice of court agreements what the New York 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 
10 June 1958 has done for arbitration agreements.”). 
149  See Spigelman, supra note 143, at 6. 
150  Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 1, pmbl. 
151  Id. art. 1. 
152  Id. art. 1 (“(1) This Convention shall apply in international cases to 
exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial matters.  
(2) For the purposes of Chapter II, a case is international unless the parties are 
resident in the same Contracting State and the relationship of the parties and all 
other elements relevant to the dispute, regardless of the location of the chosen 
court, are connected only with that State.  (3) For the purposes of Chapter III, a 
case is international where recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment is 
sought.”).  
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Brussels Regime, considers an agreement as “exclusive,” unless the 
parties clearly specified otherwise.
153
  
Article 3 Exclusive choice of court agreements 
(b) a choice of court agreement which designates the 
courts of one Contracting State or one or more 
specific courts of one Contracting State shall be 




The Hague Convention does not apply to consumer contracts and 
employment contracts.
155
  Further, the Hague Convention does not 
apply in many cases including, legal capacity of natural persons, 
maintenance obligations or other family issues, transportation contracts 
(both passengers and goods), insolvency, rights in rem in immovable 
property, and tenancies of immovable property, anti-trust, validity of 




The requirements for the validity of choice of court agreements 
are substantially the same as in the Brussels Regime: the agreement 
must be in writing or capable to be accessible for future reference.
157
   
The Hague Convention adopts the severability doctrine,
158
 i.e., a 
FSC is like a separate contract inside the contract.  
Article 3 (Exclusive choice of court agreements) 
. . .  
(d) an exclusive choice of court agreement that forms 
part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement 
independent of the other terms of the contract. The 
validity of the exclusive choice of court agreement 
                                                 
153  Id. art. 3. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. art. 2. 
156  Id. art. 2 (“Exclusions from scope.”).  
157  Id. art. 3 (“Exclusive choice of court agreements . . . . For the purposes 
of this Convention an exclusive choice of court agreement must be concluded 
or documented i) in writing; or ii) by any other means of communication which 
renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference.”). 
158  See infra pt. III for severability. 
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cannot be contested solely on the ground that the 
contract is not valid.
159
 
In analyzing the significance of the Hague Convention, Articles 5 
and 6 are particularly important.  Article 5 governs the jurisdiction of 
the chosen court.
160
  The chosen court cannot refuse to decide “a 
dispute to which the agreement applies, unless the agreement is null 
and void under the law of that State.”161  The court “shall not decline to 
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the dispute should be decided in 
a court of another State.”162  These provisions make clear that, save a 
contracting state’s reservation under Article 19,163 there is no legitimate 
possibility for a designated court of a contracting state to invoke a 
closed-door statute
164
 to refuse to hear a case, and there is no space for 
a forum non conveniens analysis.  
In addition, the enforcement of a judgment rendered by the court 
designated in a FSC is quite easy under the Hague Convention.  In fact, 
under Article 20 the grounds for nonenforcement of a judgment by the 
chosen court are limited.
165
 
                                                 
159  Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 3. 
160  Id. art. 5. 
161  Id. 
162  Id. (“Jurisdiction of the chosen court . . . . (1) The court or courts of a 
Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court agreement shall 
have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement applies, unless 
the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.  (2) A court that has 
jurisdiction under paragraph 1 shall not decline to exercise jurisdiction on the 
ground that the dispute should be decided in a court of another State.  (3) The 
preceding paragraphs shall not affect rules - (a) on jurisdiction related to 
subject matter or to the value of the claim; (b) on the internal allocation of 
jurisdiction among the courts of a Contracting State.  However, where the 
chosen court has discretion as to whether to transfer a case, due consideration 
should be given to the choice of the parties.”) 
163  Id. art. 19 (“Declarations limiting jurisdiction . . . . A State may 
declare that its courts may refuse to determine disputes to which an exclusive 
choice of court agreement applies if, except for the location of the chosen court, 
there is no connection between that State and the parties or the dispute.”). 
164  A closed-door statute is a statute that bars foreigners (or, in various 
ways depending on the statute, foreigners that have no connection with the 
state) the access to local courts.  
165  Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 20.  There is, however, the 
possibility for a contracting state to make a reservation.  (“Declarations limiting 
recognition and enforcement . . . . A State may declare that its courts may 
refuse to recognise or enforce a judgment given by a court of another 
Contracting State if the parties were resident in the requested State, and the 
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Article 6 governs the situation of every other court of contracting 
states different from the chosen court.
166
  It provides that, when the 
Convention is applicable, every court of a contracting state different 
from the chosen court “shall suspend or dismiss proceedings to which 
an exclusive choice of court agreement applies.”167  Article 6, however, 
carves out some significant exceptions.  A nonchosen court does not 
have to “suspend or dismiss proceedings” if (a) the FSC is “null and 
void” according to the “law of the State of the chosen court”; or (b) “a 
party lacked the capacity to conclude the agreement” under the forum 
law; or (c) “giving effect to the agreement would lead to a manifest 
injustice or would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of the 
State of the court seised”; or (d) for exceptional reasons beyond the 
control of the parties, the agreement cannot reasonably be performed; 
or (e) the chosen court has decided not to hear the case.
168
  Article 6 
therefore allows the persistence of elements of uncertainty connected to 
the law of the forum state.  In particular, much uncertainty is triggered 
by the “injustice” and “public policy” exceptions of letter (c).169  This 
provision allows for a wide leeway of the nonchosen court.  The 
Explanatory Report
170
 to the Convention does not provide any 
guidance:  
under paragraph (c), . . . [the non-seised court] 
applies its own concepts of “manifest injustice” and 
“public policy”. In this respect, the Convention 
differs from the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 




The Explanatory Report adds that the standards for “’manifestly 
contrary to the public policy’” and “injustice” require a “high 
threshold,”172 but the Report does not provide more guidance.  
                                                                                                 
relationship of the parties and all other elements relevant to the dispute, other 
than the location of the chosen court, were connected only with the requested 
State.”). Id. 
166  Id. art. 6 (“Obligations of a court not chosen”). 
167  Id. art. 6.  
168  Id. 
169  Id. 
170  See Hague Convention, supra note 6.  
171  Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 21, para. 4. 
172 Id. at 48, para. 153 (“The phrase ‘manifestly contrary to the public 
policy of the State of the court seised’ is intended to set a high threshold.  It 
refers to basic norms or principles of that State; it does not permit the court 
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The application of exception (d) is also quite uncertain.
173
  We do 
not know what are these “exceptional reasons beyond the control of the 
parties” for which the FSC “cannot reasonably be performed.”174  The 
Explanatory Report explains this exception with some more details and 
gives examples, but the language itself is so wide that no strict 
boundary can be fixed.  In addition, the Explanatory Report specifies 
that “it need not be absolutely impossible, but the situation must be 
exceptional.”175 
The Hague Convention applies only between contracting parties, 
i.e. when the parties to a contract have chosen a court of one of the 
contracting states to decide a dispute and enforcement of the clause or 
the judgment takes place in another contracting state.
176
  Article 26 of 
                                                                                                 
seised to hear the case simply because the chosen court might violate, in some 
technical way, a mandatory rule of the State of the court seised.  As in the case 
of manifest injustice, the standard is intended to be high: the provision does not 
permit a court to disregard a choice of court agreement simply because it would 
not be binding under domestic law.”).   
173 Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 6. 
174 Id. 
175 Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 48, para. 154 (“This is 
intended to apply to cases where it would not be possible to bring proceedings 
before the chosen court.  It need not be absolutely impossible, but the situation 
must be exceptional.  One example would be where there is a war in the State 
concerned and its courts are not functioning.  Another example would be where 
the chosen court no longer exists, or has changed to such a fundamental degree 
that it could no longer be regarded as the same court.  This exception could be 
regarded as an application of the doctrine of frustration (or similar doctrines), 
under which a contract is discharged if, due to an unanticipated and 
fundamental change of circumstances after its conclusion, it is no longer 
possible to carry it out.”). 
176 See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, para. a (“‘[E]xclusive 
choice of court agreement’ means an agreement concluded by two or more 
parties that meets the requirements of paragraph c) and designates, for the 
purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with 
a particular legal relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or 
more specific courts of one Contracting State to the exclusion of the 
jurisdiction of any other courts.”) (emphasis added), 
and  id. art. 5, para. 1 (dealing with the chosen court provides: “The court 
or courts of a Contracting State designated in an exclusive choice of court 
agreement shall have jurisdiction to decide a dispute to which the agreement 
applies, unless the agreement is null and void under the law of that State.” 
(emphasis added)), and  art. 6 (dealing with the non-chosen court states: “A 
court of a Contracting State other than that of the chosen court shall suspend or 
dismiss proceedings to which an exclusive choice of court agreement applies . . 
. .” (emphasis added)). 
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the Hague Convention coordinates with the Brussels Convention by 
providing substantially that the Brussels Convention prevails when the 
case concerns only E.U. residents.
177
 
Once the United States adopts the Convention, many issues 
connected to FSC in international agreements will have a solution, both 
at the federal level and at the state level.  
Indeed, when it takes effect, the Hague Convention will 
“preempt” conflicting federal and state law regarding the enforcement 
of FSC.
178
  The standards for enforcement under the Convention will 
govern rather than the standards that have been developed in U.S. case 
law.  In fact, as Professor Walter Heiser has pointed out, “[t]he 
mandatory nature of this treaty means that, by virtue of the Supremacy 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, its standards preempt inconsistent state 
and federal law in cases where the Convention applies.”179 
Even after ratification of the Hague Convention by the United 
States, however, a number of questions regarding the enforceability of 
FSCs may arise.  Article 6 of the Convention provides that “a court of a 
Contracting State . . . shall suspend or dismiss proceedings” brought in 
that court in favor of the chosen court unless one of five grounds 
exists.
180
  Two of these grounds are quite broad and ill-defined, 
however.  First, the court may do so if “giving effect to the agreement 
would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly contrary to 
the public policy of the State of the court seised.”181  Second, the 
“seised” court may refuse to suspend or dismiss if “for exceptional 
reasons beyond the control of the parties, the agreement cannot 
reasonably be performed.”182  Article 6 does not mention the concepts 
of “unreasonableness,” “unfairness,” and “inconvenience,” which 
pervade the law of FSC in the U.S.  After the Convention takes effect, 
however, U.S. courts may continue to apply these older doctrines to a 
greater or lesser extent under the new Convention categories of 
“manifest injustice,” or “would be manifestly contrary to the public 
policy” or cannot “reasonably be performed.”  Indeed, one 
commentator has already concluded that the Hague Convention will 
make little change in U.S. law regarding the enforcement of FSC, 
                                                 
177  See Explanatory Report, supra note 148, at 25-26, para. 26.   
178  Heiser, supra note 82, at 1013. 
179  Id. at 1039.  
180  See Hague Convention, supra note 6, art. 6. 
181  Id. para. c. 
182  Id. para. d. 
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except for reversing the interpretation of such clauses from permissive 
to exclusive.
183
   
In addition, many international commercial contracts are not 
subject to the Hague Convention.  General principles of U.S. law 
regarding FSC will continue to apply to these contracts. 
When the Hague Convention goes into effect, courts will have an 
opportunity to consider anew the grounds for refusing to enforce FSCs.  
The argument of this paper—that efficiency and reasonable expectation 
of contracting parties justify limiting the grounds for denial of 
enforcement of international commercial FSC to ordinary contract 
grounds, excluding reasonableness, unfairness, and inconvenience—is 
therefore particularly timely and important at this moment before the 
Hague Convention takes effect. 
 
III. ANALOGY WITH ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
This section argues that there is a strong analogy between FSCs 
and arbitration clauses based on history, policy, and interpretation.  
Despite this affinity, the standards for enforcement of FSCs are 
currently more demanding than the standards for enforcement of 
arbitration agreements.
184
  Arbitration agreements are enforceable so 
long as they comply with basic contractual requirements.
185
  Standards 
such as unreasonableness, unfairness, violation of public policy, and 
oppressive bargaining power, which apply to FSCs (although as Part I 
shows the exact meaning and application of these standards is unclear), 
do not apply to arbitration agreements.  This disparity in treatment for 
analogous concepts provides support for the argument of Part IV that 
FSCs between commercial parties in international transactions should 




                                                 
183  See Heiser, supra note 82, at 1049. 
184 See Mariana Isabel Hernández-Gutiérrez, Forum-Selection and 
Arbitration Clauses in International Commercial Contracts: Does the New 
York Convention Call for a Heightened Enforceability Standard? 18 
CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J. 55 (2009) (for a comparison between the standard 
of enforcement of arbitration clauses and FSCs).   
185 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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A. HISTORY OF AND POLICY REGARDING ENFORCEABILITY OF 
ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
Historically, courts treated arbitration clauses skeptically because 
they were viewed as ousting courts of jurisdiction.
186
  Congress 
changed this judicial attitude with the enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.  Section 2 of the Act states: 
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving 
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy 
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, 
or the refusal to perform the whole or any part 
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to 
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such 
a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract (emphasis added).
187
 
The FAA was based on two policies: cost reduction and freedom 
of contract.  As the Court said in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co., the 
FAA was designed “to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of litigation,’ 
and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts.’”188  Arbitration agreements can reduce the cost of litigation 
because they can eliminate or minimize discovery costs, increase the 
speed of dispute resolution, avoid lengthy jury trials, and minimize the 
possibility of appeal.  However, some critics of arbitration have 
complained that the broad enforcement of arbitration agreements 




                                                 
186 See Kevin A. Sullivan, Comment, The Problems of Permitting 
Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards under the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002) (for the historic evolution of the attitude 
towards the arbitration clause). 
187 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
188 Scherk, 417 U.S. at 510-11. 
189 See H.R. Res. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted) [Hereinafter 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009] (the Bill makes the following assumptions: 
“(1) The Federal Arbitration Act (now enacted as chapter 1 of title 9 of the 
United States Code) was intended to apply to disputes between commercial 
entities of generally similar sophistication and bargaining power.  (2) A series 
of United States Supreme Court decisions have changed the meaning of the Act 
so that it now extends to disputes between parties of greatly disparate economic 
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B. INTERPRETATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
1. Deference to Arbitration in General  
In interpreting and applying the FAA, the Supreme Court, time 
and time again, has shown great deference to arbitration.  While a 
complete review of the Supreme Court’s arbitration decisions is beyond 
the scope of this paper, a few examples are sufficient to make the point 
that the Supreme Court has in cases of doubt adopted principles that 
favor arbitration.   
First, the Supreme Court has clarified that courts have a duty to 
enforce arbitration agreements even when the agreement relates to 
claims of statutory violations.  For example, in Shearson/American 
Express Inc. v. McMahon,
 
the Supreme Court declared that 
[t]he Arbitration Act . . . establishes a “federal policy 
favoring arbitration,” Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 
460 U.S. 24 (1983), requiring that “we rigorously 
enforce agreements to arbitrate.” Dean Witter 
Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, supra, at 470 U.S. 221. This 
duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not 
diminished when a party bound by an agreement 
raises a claim founded on statutory rights.
190
 
                                                                                                 
power, such as consumer disputes and employment disputes . . . . (3) Most 
consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether to 
submit their claims to arbitration . . . . (5) Mandatory arbitration undermines the 
development of public law for civil rights and consumer rights, because there is 
no meaningful judicial review of arbitrators' decisions . . . . (6) Mandatory 
arbitration is a poor system for protecting civil rights and consumer rights 
because it is not transparent . . . . (7) Many corporations add to their arbitration 
clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals, 
including provisions that strip individuals of substantive statutory rights, ban 
class actions, and force people to arbitrate their claims hundreds of miles from 
their homes . . . .”  Among other things, the Bill—if approved—would modify 
the FAA by prohibiting pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment, 
consumer, franchise disputes, and civil rights disputes.  The Bill would insert 
the following in Section 2 of FAA: “(b) No predispute arbitration agreement 
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of – (1) an employment, 
consumer, or franchise dispute; or (2) a dispute arising under any statute 
intended to protect civil rights.”).    
190   Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987). 
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Second, the Supreme Court has held that the FAA applies both in 
federal and in state courts.
191
  Therefore, the FAA preempts state laws 
on enforceability of arbitration provisions.   Third, the Supreme Court 




Fourth, the Supreme Court has stated the important doctrine of 
“separability” in relation to arbitration.  The doctrine was stated for the 
first time in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 
where the Court held that because an arbitration clause is a separate 
contract from the contract containing the arbitration clause, the claim of 
fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole (as opposed to fraud 
with regard to the arbitration clause itself) must be decided by the 
arbitrator.
 193
  After Prima Paint, courts have consistently applied this 
doctrine to voidable contracts but not to void contracts.
194
  In Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, the Supreme Court reinforced and 
expanded the separability doctrine of Prima Paint by applying the 
doctrine to claims of voidness: “We reaffirm today that, regardless of 
whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a challenge to 
the validity of the contract as a whole, and not specifically to the 
arbitration clause, must go to the arbitrator.” 195  
Buckeye Check Cashing is also important because it makes clear 
that the separability doctrine applies also in state courts and preempts 
any inconsistent state law because the doctrine rests on Section 2 of 
FAA, which applies in both federal and state proceedings:
196
 
“[separability] ultimately arises out of § 2, the FAA’s substantive 
command that arbitration agreements be treated like all other 
                                                 
191  Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1984) (“We would 
expect that if Congress, in enacting the Arbitration Act, was creating what it 
thought to be a procedural rule applicable only in federal courts, it would not so 
limit the Act to transactions involving commerce.  On the other hand, Congress 
would need to call on the Commerce Clause if it intended the Act to apply in 
state courts.  Yet at the same time, its reach would be limited to transactions 
involving interstate commerce.  We therefore view the ‘involving commerce’ 
requirement in §2, not as an inexplicable limitation on the power of the federal 
courts, but as a necessary qualification on a statute intended to apply in state 
and federal courts.”) 
192   See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008). 
193  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 
403 (1967). 
194  See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Law's Separability Doctrine After 
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 8 NEV. L.J. 107, 110-11 (2007). 
195   Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006). 
196  Id. at 446-47. 
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contracts.”197   
Fifth, the Supreme Court has issued important decisions with 
reference to the power of arbitrators.  In fact, between issuing the two 
separability decisions of Prima Paint and Buckeye Check Cashing, the 
Supreme Court unanimously decided First Options of Chicago, Inc., v.  
Kaplan, which held that when the parties did not agree on who should 
decide the arbitrability issue, arbitrability is subject to independent 
review by the courts.
198
  First Options stands for the proposition that 
the parties can decide whether to insert a clause in the agreement that 
delegates to an arbitrator the power to decide the arbitrability of the 
dispute.
199
  In the case of First Options, the parties had not delegated 




Most recently, in June 2010, the Supreme Court decided Rent-A-
Center, Inc. v. Jackson, in which the parties had delegated certain 
powers (in particular the power to decide unconscionability issues) to 
the arbitrator.
 201
  The specific issue for the Court here was whether “a 
district court may decide a claim that an arbitration agreement is 
unconscionable, where the agreement explicitly assigns that decision to 
the arbitrator.”202  The Supreme Court held that a court could not.203  
Rent-A-Center v. Jackson stands for the proposition that where an 
agreement to arbitrate includes a clause that the arbitrator will 
determine the enforceability of the agreement, if a party challenges 
specifically the enforceability of that particular delegation agreement, 
the district court considers the challenge, but if a party challenges the 
enforceability of the agreement as a whole, the challenge is for the 
arbitrator.
204
   
                                                 
197  Id. at 447. 
198  First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995). 
199  Id. at 944-45. 
200  Id. 
201  Rent-A-Ctr., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2775 (2010). 
202  Id. (Even if Rent-a-Center is not a case on severability, in footnote 3 
of the majority’s opinion, Justice Scalia reaffirms that severability is the rule 
also with an agreement of this type: “[The dissent] gives no logical reason why 
an agreement to arbitrate one controversy (an employment-discrimination 
claim) is not severable from an agreement to arbitrate a different controversy 
(enforceability).  There is none.”) Id. at 2779 n.3.   
203  Id. at 2780-81. 
204  See Alan Scott Rau, Comments on Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. 
Jackson, CONVERSATIONS ABOUT DISPUTE RESOLUTION (June 22, 2010), 
http://www.karlbayer.com/blog/?p=9699. (As one scholar has correctly pointed 
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2. Deference to Arbitration of International Contracts Between 
Commercial Parties 
The Supreme Court has shown a particular willingness to enforce 
arbitration agreements between sophisticated commercial parties in an 
international setting.  In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Co.,
 
the Supreme 
Court held that an arbitration agreement between an American buyer 
and a German seller to arbitrate in Paris all disputes arising from a 
contract to sell three enterprises was enforceable even though the 
dispute involved claims of fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934.
 205
  In reaching this decision the Court distinguished Wilko v. 
Swann where the Court had held that an agreement to arbitrate claims 
under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 was unenforceable.
 
206
  While the Court found that there were linguistic differences 
between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act,
207
 its decision was based in 
part on the policy considerations involved in international contracts 
between commercial parties.
208
  The Court stated that, unlike Wilko, 
Scherk involved a “truly international agreement” that raised different 
policies and considerations: 
 . . . [I]n the absence of the arbitration provision 
considerable uncertainty existed at the time of the 
agreement, and still exists, concerning the law 
applicable to the resolution of disputes arising out of 
the contract.    
Such uncertainty will almost inevitably exist with 
respect to any contract touching two or more 
countries, each with its own substantive laws and 
conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision 
specifying in advance the forum in which disputes 
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is, 
therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to 
achievement of the orderliness and predictability 
essential to any international business transaction. 
Furthermore, such a provision obviates the danger 
                                                                                                 
out: “With nothing in the contract, the question of the ‘unconscionability’ of 
the arbitration clause—here, unconscionability because of ‘one sidedness,’ and 
because of ‘limitations on discovery’—would indeed be a matter for the 
court.”). 
205  See Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.   
206  Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
207  Scherk, 417 U.S. at 513–15.   
208  See id. at 515–17. 
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that a dispute under the agreement might be 
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of 




In addition, and importantly to the thesis of this article, the Court 
cited Bremen in support of its conclusion.
210
  While Bremen involved a 
FSC, the Court found the situations analogous because “an agreement 
to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of 
forum-selection clause.”211 
 The enforcement of arbitration clauses in international contracts 
has also benefited from the 1970 accession of the United States to the 
New York Arbitration Convention.
212
  The Supreme Court made 
reference to this Convention as a special reason for enforcing an 
arbitration agreement in Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth.
213
  
Before discussing Mitsubishi, let us outline the major points of the New 
York Arbitration Convention. 
214
  
First, the Convention establishes a duty for the courts of the 
contracting states to enforce a written arbitration agreement (both in the 
form of an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, 
signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of correspondence): 
The courts must “recognize an agreement” of this sort and “when 
seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the parties have 
made an [arbitration] agreement,” the court must “at the request of one 
of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said 
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.”215  
                                                 
209  Id. at 516.   
210  Id. at 518. 
211  Id. 
212  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. [hereinafter New York Arbitration 
Convention], available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1959/06/ 
19590607%2009-35%20PM/Ch_XXII_01p.pdf.  The New York Arbitration 
Convention has been very successful.  As for today, 144 countries have adopted 
the Convention.  For a complete list of adopting countries, see The New York 
Arbitration Convention Contracting States, NEW YORK ARBITRATION 
CONVENTION (May 9, 2011), http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-york-
convention-countries/contracting-states.  
213  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 638 (1985).       
214  See The New York Convention, supra note 114.    
215  New York Arbitration Convention, supra note 212, art. II.  (“(1.) Each 
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Second, the Convention imposes upon the courts of the 
contracting states a duty to recognize and enforce the arbitration 
awards;
216
 the recognition and enforcement can be refused only on the 
(limited) grounds established by Article V.
217
  
As a consequence of the Convention, when the parties have 
agreed in writing to devolve their controversy (actual or potential) to 
arbitration, there is no possibility to sue in front of a court.
218
  If a party 
                                                                                                 
Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have 
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration.  (2.) The term “agreement in writing” shall include an 
arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or 
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.  (3.) The court of a 
Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of which the 
parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the 
request of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that 
the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being 
performed.” (emphasis added)). 
216  Id. art. III.  (“Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as 
binding and enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the 
territory where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the 
following articles.” (emphasis added)). 
217  Id. art. V. (“(1.) (“Recognition and enforcement of the award may be 
refused, at the request of the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party 
furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is 
sought, proof that: (a) The parties to the agreement . . . . were, under the law 
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid 
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication 
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or (b) The 
party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the 
appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was otherwise 
unable to present his case; or (c) The award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, 
or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to 
arbitration . . . . ; or (d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral 
procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing 
such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the 
arbitration took place; or (e) The award has not yet become binding on the 
parties . . . . (emphasis added). (2.) Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral 
award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where 
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) The subject matter of the 
difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that 
country; or (b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary 
to the public policy of that country.”). 
218  Id. art. II. 
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tries to do that, the court, on request of the other party, must refuse to 
hear the case and must refer the controversy to the arbitrator.
219
  Once 
the arbitrator has rendered an arbitration award, the award is binding
220
 
and shall easily be recognized and enforced in any contracting state
221
 
unless one of the grounds listed in Article V is present.
222
  It is 
undisputable that there is no reasonableness analysis and the space 
given to public policy is quite reduced.  The arbitration agreement is 
obviously interpreted as “exclusive,” because any court has the duty to 
refuse to hear the case unless “it finds that the said agreement is null 
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed”.223  The 
Convention is clearly inspired by a freedom-of-contract principle and 
shows significant confidence in the ability of the parties to protect 
themselves in negotiations.   
Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth involved a multi-party 
contract for the distribution and sale of automobiles among two 
Japanese corporations, a Swiss corporation, and a Puerto Rican 
corporation.
 224
  The agreement contained a clause providing for 
arbitration by the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association.
225
  After 
disputes arose, Mitsubishi brought suit under the federal Arbitration 
Act and the New York Convention, seeking an order to compel 
arbitration of the disputes in accordance with the arbitration clause.
226
  
The case included claims for violation of the U.S. antitrust laws.
227
  The 
court of appeals, applying American Safety Equipment Corp.,
 
 held that 
antitrust claims were not arbitrable.
 228
  The Supreme Court reversed 
and held in favor of arbitration relying on the “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”229 
                                                 
219  Id. art. II, para. 3. 
220  Id. art. III. 
221  Id. art. IV. 
222  Id. art. V. 
223  Id. art. II, para. 3. 
224  Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. 
227  Id. 
228  See id. at 623 ((endorsing the doctrine based upon Am. Safety Equip. 
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968)) (uniformly followed 
by the courts of appeal, holding that rights conferred by the antitrust laws are 
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration)).  
229  Id. at 625-26.  
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Importantly, the Supreme Court held that the reasons for 
enforcing an arbitration clause were particularly compelling in an 
international setting:  
[W]e conclude that concerns of international comity, 
respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational 
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the 
international commercial system for predictability in 
the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the 
parties’ agreement, even assuming that a contrary 
result would be forthcoming in a domestic context. 
Even before Scherk, this Court had recognized the 




In Mitsubishi the Court treated arbitration clauses and FSC the 
same but specified that the enforcement of an arbitration clause was 
reinforced by federal statutes and international treaties.
231
  The 
reference is to the New York Arbitration Convention: 
Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in 
favor of enforcement of freely negotiated contractual 
choice-of-forum provisions. Here . . . that 
presumption is reinforced by the emphatic federal 
policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution. And at 
least since this Nation’s accession in 1970 to the 
Convention . . . and the implementation of the 
Convention in the same year by amendment of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, that federal policy applies 
with special force in the field of international 
commerce. Thus, we must weigh the concerns of 
American Safety against a strong belief in the 
efficacy of arbitral procedures for the resolution of 
international commercial disputes and an equal 




 In addition to the New York Arbitration Convention, the United 
States is also party to the 1979 Inter-American Convention on 
International Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”).233  
                                                 
230  Id. at 629.   
231  See id. at 634-40. 
232   Id. at 631. 
233  United Nations Panama Convention Establishing the Latin American 
Economic System (SELA), Oct. 17, 1975, 1292 U.N.T.S. 21295 [hereinafter 
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The Panama Convention governs international arbitral awards between 
the signatory states.
234
  There are differences between the Panama and 
the New York Conventions, for example the grounds for recognition 
and enforcement of arbitral awards under the two conventions 
diverge.
235
  The Panama Convention, unlike the New York Convention, 
contains a provision that makes the rules of procedures of the Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration Commission the default rules in 
case the parties do not agree otherwise.
236
  While a full analysis of the 
Panama Convention is outside the scope of this paper,
237
 we want to 
highlight that, like the New York Convention, reasonableness is not a 
requirement for enforceability under the Panama Convention.
238
  Public 
policy is not a reason to avoid enforcement of an arbitration clause but 
only a possible ground for nonenforcement of an arbitration award.  
C. ANALOGY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS TO FSCS 
There is a close affinity between arbitration agreements and 
FSCs.  This affinity supports the argument that in international 
commercial agreements, FSCs should not be burdened by special 
enforcement hurdles.
239
   
First, arbitration agreements and FSCs have undergone a similar 
evolution.  Both were originally disfavored because they ousted courts 
of jurisdiction.  Both have undergone a modern evolution in which 
disfavor has been transformed into support.  As the Fourth Circuit 
stated in Albemarle Corp. v. AstraZeneca, LP: “[The] historical 
                                                                                                 
Panama Convention].  The Panama Convention entered into force on June 16, 
1976.  The U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification with the OAS 
(Organization of American States) on September 27, 1990.  The Panama 
Convention has been incorporated into U.S. law through §§ 301-07 of the FAA. 
234  Id.  The countries bound by the Panama Convention (as of 2002) are: 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, USA, Uruguay, 
Venezuela.  All these countries have also adopted the New York Convention.  
Even if the Convention was open to states located outside the American 
continent, none have accessed. 
235  Compare id. art. V, with New York Arbitration Convention, supra 
note 212, art. V.  
236   Panama Convention, supra note 233, art. III.  
237  For a comprehensive analysis of the Panama Convention and of the 
differences between the Panama and the New York Conventions, see generally 
JOHN P. BOWMAN, PANAMA CONVENTION AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION UNDER THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (2002).  
238  For the grounds of invalidity of an arbitral agreement, see Panama 
Convention, supra note 233, art. V.  
239  See infra pt. IV.   
248 SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF [Vol. 8.2 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 
 
reluctance to enforce [FSCs] . . . was not unlike the historical 
reluctance to enforce arbitration clauses.”240  It is true that the FAA was 
a major force in the development of arbitration, while there has been no 
such legislation regarding FSCs, but this difference is probably 
overstated, as discussed below. 
Second, arbitration agreements and FSCs perform similar 
functions and are based on similar policy considerations.  Both 
arbitration agreements and FSCs are methods of dispute resolution.  
The enforceability of both arbitration agreements and FSCs is based on 
policies of freedom of contract and cost reduction, although the mix of 
cost reduction is different for the two types of clauses.  Arbitration 
agreements can reduce the cost of litigation because they can eliminate 
or minimize discovery costs, increase the speed of dispute resolution, 
avoid lengthy jury trials, and minimize the possibility of appeal.  FSCs 
can reduce litigation costs by eliminating or minimizing disputes over 
the appropriate forum.  In addition, the use of a particular forum can 
reduce litigation costs depending on the law of that forum, for example 
whether it allows discovery or jury trials, and can also reduce the time 
of litigation, depending on the burden of that court’s roll.  
Third, the Supreme Court has recognized the similarity of 
arbitration clauses and FSCs, particularly in the international context.  
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., the Court stated: “An agreement to 
arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of 
forum selection clause.”241  In Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
while upholding the enforceability of an international arbitration 
agreement, the Court relied on its prior decisions dealing with FSCs: 
“Bremen and Scherk establish a strong presumption in favor of 
enforcement of freely negotiated contractual choice-of-forum 
provisions.”242 
To be sure, there is a major difference between the change in 
policy regarding arbitration clauses and FSCs.  The change in judicial 
attitude toward arbitration clauses resulted at least initially from an act 
of Congress that specified the grounds for enforcing such clauses, i.e. 
the FAA.  The change in attitude with regard to FSCs came from 
judicial decision.  While Bremen and Carnival Cruise show a 
fundamental change in judicial treatment of FSCs, the Court hedged its 
                                                 
240  Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 649.  
241  Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519.  
242  Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 631 (1985).  
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holdings.  The restrictions on FSCs, however, probably are more 
reflective of limitations on the judicial role than a fundamentally 
different treatment of arbitration clauses and FSCs.  Not surprisingly, 
courts are reluctant to make a statutory-like change in the law because 
they do not have the authority to make law for future situations and 
because they have doubts about their ability to foresee all the possible 
situations that may arise.  In addition, FSCs may now be undergoing a 
similar evolution through conventions and statutory enactment.  The 
United States has signed the Hague Convention.  Assuming it is 
ratified, an act of Congress will implement the Convention, providing a 
further parallel between arbitration agreements and FSCs.  
 
IV.   SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNSOLVED ISSUES 
REGARDING FSCS 
Part I of the paper has shown that there are a number of 
unresolved issues regarding the enforceability and interpretation of 
FSCs.  This section offers answers to these questions.  Anticipating the 
specific answers discussed below, the general argument of this section 
is that FSCs contained in international commercial agreements should 
be subject to the same rules that govern the enforceability of arbitration 
clauses.  Under this principle courts should discard the limitations of 
reasonableness, unfairness, and oppressive bargaining power; the 
public policy limitation should be narrowed to situations in which 
under general contract principles a FSC would be unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy.  The argument of this section is compatible 
with the Hague Convention, once it goes into effect, if the courts 
interpret, as it is our opinion they should, (a) “manifest injustice” as 
used in the Convention to mean “unenforceability as a matter of 
contract law” and (b) “public policy” to mean “unenforceable as a 
matter of public policy under general principles of contract law.”  Part 
A of this section sets forth the policy arguments in favor of the 
principle set forth in this section.  Parts B, C, and D apply this principle 
to the limitations on FSCs developed by the Supreme Court in Bremen 
and Carnival Cruise.  Part E argues that the interpretation of a FSC 
should be according to the law of the chosen court.  Part F contends 
that unless the parties have specified otherwise in their clause, courts 
should interpret a FSC as exclusive.     
A. POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RESTRICTING THE BASES FOR 
DENYING ENFORCEMENT OF FSCS TO THE GROUNDS APPLICABLE TO 
ORDINARY CONTRACTS 
The policy arguments that are the basis of this section find 
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expression in Bremen.  There the Court stated: 
The threshold question is whether [the trial court] . . . 
should have exercised its jurisdiction to do more than 
give effect to the legitimate expectations of the 
parties, manifested in their freely negotiated 
agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum 
clause.  
There are compelling reasons why a freely negotiated 
private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, 
undue influence, or overweening bargaining 
power,
243
 such as that involved here, should be given 
full effect. In this case . . . , the tow of an extremely 
costly piece of equipment . . .  was to traverse the 
waters of many jurisdictions . . . there were countless 
possible ports of refuge. . . . It cannot be doubted for 
a moment that the parties sought to provide for a 
neutral forum for the resolution of any disputes 
arising during the tow. Manifestly much uncertainty 
and possibly great inconvenience to both parties 
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any 
jurisdiction in which an accident might occur or if 
jurisdiction were left to any place where Bremen or 
Unterweser might happen to be found. The 
elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in 
advance on a forum acceptable to both parties is an 
indispensable element in international trade, 
commerce, and contracting. There is strong evidence 
that the forum clause was a vital part of the 
agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that 
the parties did not conduct their negotiations, 
including fixing the monetary terms, with the 
consequences of the forum clause figuring 




In this passage the Court gives essentially two reasons for the 
enforceability of a FSC:  First, the Court emphasizes the principle of 
freedom of contract both in general and by specific reference to the 
                                                 
243  Bremen, 407 U.S. 1.  This article argues that the limitation of 
“overweening bargaining power” should not apply in an international 
commercial contract.  See infra pt. IV at D. 
244   Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12-14.  
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likelihood that the parties considered the effect of the clause in their 
negotiations of the contract.
245
  Second, the Court offers an efficiency 
justification for enforcement of the clause in this type of case.
246
  
Because of the possibility of multiple jurisdictions in which a case 
could be brought, enforcement of the clause eliminates the costly 
uncertainty and inconvenience that would result.   
The efficiency justification offered by the Court operates at a 
micro level, i.e. the level of the parties to a particular contract where 
uncertainty may arise about the forum that governs the resolution of 
their specific dispute.  In another passage of Bremen the Court makes a 
broader, macro efficiency argument, based on the needs of American 
companies in international commerce: 
The expansion of American business and industry 
will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn 
contracts, we insist on a parochial concept that all 
disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our 
courts. Absent a contract forum, the considerations 
relied on by the Court of Appeals would be 
persuasive reasons for holding an American forum 
convenient in the traditional sense, but in an era of 
expanding world trade and commerce, the absolute 
aspects of the doctrine of the Carbon Black case have 
little place and would be a heavy hand indeed on the 
future development of international commercial 
dealings by Americans. We cannot have trade and 
commerce in world markets and international waters 
exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and 
resolved in our courts.
247
 
                                                 
245  See id. 12-14 (In another part of the opinion the Court emphasizes 
freedom of contract as a justification for the enforceability of FSC: “It accords 
with ancient concepts of freedom of contract and reflects an appreciation of the 
expanding horizons of American contractors who seek business in all parts of 
the world.  Not surprisingly, foreign businessmen prefer, as do we, to have 
disputes resolved in their own courts, but if that choice is not available, then in 
a neutral forum with expertise in the subject matter.  Plainly, the courts of 
England meet the standards of neutrality and long experience in admiralty 
litigation.  The choice of that forum was made in an arm’s-length negotiation 
by experienced and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compelling 
and countervailing reason it should be honored by the parties and enforced by 
the courts.”).  Id. at 11-12. 
246  See id. at 11-12. 
247   Id. at 9.  
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The change in scope of commerce from local to international is one of 
the reasons why full enforceability of a FSC is particularly important.  
In a global market, not enforcing a FSC allows litigation in a place and 
under a law that might be completely different from the one that the 
parties had in mind when they chose the forum.  This was not true in 
days when commerce was primarily local.  In those days the disregard 
of a FSC would probably (although not always) had little impact on the 
result.  For example, a lawsuit between a Florida and a New York 
company—whether brought in Florida or New York—would be based 
on similar common law and statutory provisions.  
The uncertainty of FSC enforcement represents a legal obstacle to 
competitiveness.
248
  A broader approach to enforceability would be 
particularly important in a time of recession—one we have been living 
in recent years—as a way to increase business for American 
companies.  Indeed in 1972, a year between two recessions, the 
Supreme Court opined that the unenforceability of a FSC acted as a 
hindrance for American commerce.
249
  Today, in a highly competitive 
global market, the current and uncertain limitations on enforceability 
risk to have the same effect. 
In addition to freedom of contract and efficiency, both fairness 
and history support general enforceability of FSCs.  Uncertainty 
regarding the enforceability of FSCs can create unfairness to the party 
seeking relief for breach of contract.  Jurisdiction (along with venue) is 
a major litigation issue both in the U.S. and in many other countries.  
Sir Anthony Clarke, English Master of the Rolls, shows the prevalence 
and potential unfairness of jurisdictional uncertainty: 
I have spent much of my professional life both at the 
Bar and as a judge dealing with cases in which 
parties, usually defendants, have done their utmost to 
avoid having the dispute tried on the merits in 
England. Arguments of every kind have been 
deployed over the years to persuade courts that the 
interests of justice lie in the issues being determined 
elsewhere, although in very many cases the true 
position is that the defendant’s real interest is to 
ensure (if at all possible) that the issues will in 
                                                 
248 See generally Daniel Mitchell, Competitiveness Means Less 
Government, Not More, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Apr. 20, 2006), 
http://heritage.org/research/reports/2006/04/competitiveness-means-less-
government-not-more.  
249  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 9.   
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practice never be determined at all.
250
 
In the current situation, however, with the enforceability of FSCs 
subject to a standard of reasonableness, to unclear policy limitations, 
and to a narrow interpretation of permissiveness, the insertion of a FSC 
in an agreement fails to produce certainty; indeed any of these issues 
can be the subject of much litigation.  By contrast, eliminating the 
reasonableness analysis, circumscribing the public policy limitations to 
those applicable to contracts in general, and interpreting clauses 
according to the law of the chosen forum and as exclusive would 
substantially increase certainty in the enforcement of FSCs in 
accordance with the intention of the parties when the contract was 
formed.  
Finally, restrictions on the enforceability of FSCs are unsound as 
a matter of history.  As the Court said in Bremen: 
The argument that such clauses are improper because 
they tend to “oust” a court of jurisdiction is hardly 
more than a vestigial legal fiction. It appears to rest at 
core on historical judicial resistance to any attempt to 
reduce the power and business of a particular court 
and has little place in an era when all courts are 
overloaded and when businesses once essentially 
local now operate in world markets.
251
 
In addition, as discussed above, there is a close relationship 
between FSCs and arbitration clauses.  The Supreme Court has said an 
arbitration clause is a form of FSC.
252
  Over the last century 
enforceability of arbitration clauses has evolved from nonenforceable 
to enforceable, subject to contractual limitations on their enforcement.  
While the FAA and the New York Arbitration Convention were a 
significant impetus for this change, the policy reasons for the full 
enforcement of FSCs are similar to the justifications for the full 
enforcement of arbitration clauses.  This paper argues in essence that 
the standards for enforcement of FSCs should evolve like the standards 
for arbitration clauses, i.e. full enforcement limited only by the 
defenses applicable to ordinary contracts. 
                                                 
250  The Right Honourable Sir Anthony Clarke, Master of the Rolls, The 
Differing Approach to Commercial Litigation in the European Court of Justice 
and the Courts of England and Wales (Feb. 23, 2006), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/media/speeches/2006/speech-mor-23022006.   
251  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.  
252  Scherk, 417 U.S. 506.  
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B. FSCS SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO A REASONABLENESS ANALYSIS 
For the reasons given above, a FSC in an international 
commercial contract should not be subject to reasonableness analysis.  
When courts engage in a reasonableness analysis they substitute their 
judgment for the judgment of the parties regarding what is reasonable, 
which is inconsistent with the basic principle of freedom of contract.  
Moreover, as was true in Bremen, in international commercial contracts 
there is always the possibility of multiple fora for the litigation.  
Presumably the parties took this possibility into account when they 
chose their forum in the contract.  Evaluation of the reasonableness of 
FSCs increases uncertainty and litigation costs.  Moreover, as Judge 
Clarke remarked, claims of unreasonableness are often made by 
defendants to avoid having the case decided at all, an obviously unfair 
situation.
253
   
In the U.S. courts do not engage in reasonableness analysis when 
enforcing arbitration clauses.  Considering the similarity between FSCs 
and arbitration clauses, FSCs should also not be subject to a 
reasonableness analysis.   
We are not aware of other countries applying a reasonableness 
analysis because certainty is a high value elsewhere.
254
  In addition, 
international treaties—like the Hague Convention—dealing with FSCs 
do not provide for a reasonableness analysis.  The U.S. government has 
shown its appreciation of the Hague Convention by signing it in 
January 2009. 
C. THE PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATION ON FSCS SHOULD BE THE SAME AS 
APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTS IN GENERAL 
We have seen above that it is unclear which public policies might 
make a FSC clause unenforceable.  It might be that the limitation based 
on forum public policy is only applicable where the transaction does 
not present elements of “internationality” (i.e., only where the contract 
is between two Americans to solve an inherently local transaction).  
Should this view be correct, the uncertainty coming from the public 
policy limitation would be less significant.  However, it is unclear 
whether the public policy limitation is in fact this restricted.   
No one can seriously doubt that every situation of uncertainty in 
                                                 
253  See Clarke, supra note 250 and accompanying text. 
254 For example, the European legal system seems more focused on 
“certainty” than on fairness and efficiency. See, e.g., Brussels I Regulation, 
supra note 118, at 1, 2 (“The rules of jurisdiction must be highly predictable.”).  
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the enforceability of a contractual provision represents a possible 
hindrance to trade.  The uncertainty arising from the lack of clarity 
about the public policy limitation has an easy remedy:  FSCs should not 
be subject to a special public policy analysis.  Instead the issue should 
be solved applying general contractual principles.    
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts §178 provides when a 
contractual term is void because of violation of public policy:  
A promise or other term of an agreement is 
unenforceable on grounds of public policy if [i] 
legislation provides that it is unenforceable or [ii] the 
interest in its enforcement is clearly outweighed in 
the circumstances by a public policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.
255
 
In other words, the Restatement provides for two situations of 
unenforceability: (1) There is a statute that provides that a certain 
contractual term is unenforceable because of public policy, which is 
rare;
256
 (2) the court is called to make a balance between the public 
policy and the interest for enforcement.  
Even if uncertainty would not completely disappear under this 
balancing analysis, it would greatly diminish because the type of 
balance that the court has to do is quite structured. Restatement §178(2) 
and (3) provide that: 
(2) In weighing the interest in the enforcement of a 
term, account is taken of (a) the parties’ justified 
expectations, (b) any forfeiture that would result if 
                                                 
255  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS  § 178(1) (1981). 
256  Id. § 178 cmt. a (“Legislation providing for unenforceability.  
Occasionally, on grounds of public policy, legislation provides that specified 
kinds of promises or other terms are unenforceable.  Whether such legislation is 
valid and applicable to the particular term in dispute is beyond the scope of this 
Restatement.  Assuming that it is, the court is bound to carry out the legislative 
mandate with respect to the enforceability of the term.  But with respect to such 
other matters as the enforceability of the rest of the agreement (§§ 183, 184) 
and the possibility of restitution (Topic 5), a court will be guided by the same 
rules that apply to other terms unenforceable on grounds of public policy . . . . 
absent contrary provision in the legislation itself . . . . The term “legislation” is 
used here in the broadest sense to include any fixed text enacted by a body with 
authority to promulgate rules, including not only statutes, but constitutions and 
local ordinances, as well as administrative regulations issued pursuant to them.  
It also encompasses foreign laws to the extent that they are applicable under 
conflict of laws rules.”). 
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enforcement were denied, and (c) any special public 
interest in the enforcement of the particular term. 
(3) In weighing a public policy against enforcement 
of a term, account is taken of (a) the strength of that 
policy as manifested by legislation or judicial 
decisions, (b) the likelihood that a refusal to enforce 
the term will further that policy, (c) the seriousness of 
any misconduct involved and the extent to which it 
was deliberate, and (d) the directness of the 
connection between that misconduct and the term.  
In addition, courts have the guidance of the comments to 
Restatement §178 both on the balancing factors
257
 and on the 
evaluation of the strength of a public policy.
258
 
Applying this standard, it would be very rare that a FSC in an 
international commercial contract would be unenforceable.  First, as for 
                                                 
257  Id. § 178 cmt. b (“Balancing of interests.  Only infrequently does 
legislation, on grounds of public policy, provide that a term is unenforceable.  
When a court reaches that conclusion, it usually does so on the basis of a public 
policy derived either from its own perception of the need to protect some aspect 
of the public welfare or from legislation that is relevant to that policy although 
it says nothing explicitly about unenforceability.  See §179.  In some cases the 
contravention of public policy is so grave, as when an agreement involves a 
serious crime or tort, that unenforceability is plain.  In other cases the 
contravention is so trivial as that it plainly does not preclude enforcement.  In 
doubtful cases, however, a decision as to enforceability is reached only after a 
careful balancing, in the light of all the circumstances, of the interest in the 
enforcement of the particular promise against the policy against the 
enforcement of such terms.  The most common factors in the balancing process 
are set out in Subsections (2) and (3).  Enforcement will be denied only if the 
factors that argue against enforcement clearly outweigh the law’s traditional 
interest in protecting the expectations of the parties, its abhorrence of any 
unjust enrichment, and any public interest in the enforcement of the particular 
term.”) (emphasis added).  
258  Id. § 178 cmt. c (“Strength of policy.  The strength of the public policy 
involved is a critical factor in the balancing process.  Even when the policy is 
one manifested by legislation, it may be too insubstantial to outweigh the 
interest in the enforcement of the term in question. . . . A court should be 
particularly alert to this possibility in the case of minor administrative 
regulations or local ordinances that may not be indicative of the general 
welfare.  A disparity between a relatively modest criminal sanction provided by 
the legislature and a much larger forfeiture that will result if enforcement of the 
promise is refused may suggest that the policy is not substantial enough to 
justify the refusal.”).   
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the violation of a statutory public policy, we are unaware of any statute 
that declares a FSC unenforceable.  Second, as for the balancing test, 
let us take an example taken from Bremen.  In Bremen, the Court 
discussed the public policy involved in the Bisso doctrine.
259
  Under the 
approach suggested above, a court in deciding whether to enforce a 
FSC in an international towing contract would balance the interest in 
FSC enforcement against the public policy against enforcement of 
exculpatory clauses in such contracts.  The balance would strongly 
favor enforcement of FSCs.  On the positive side the parties have a 
justified expectation in enforcement of a FSC especially because of the 
possibility of litigation in multiple jurisdictions.  On the negative side 
the strength of the public policy is weak because the Bisso doctrine 
applies to accidents that occur in American waters, which was not the 
situation in Bremen.  Obviously, the reasoning would be different in 
case of an accident that occurred in domestic waters between two 
American companies; the strength of the public policy would be greater 
because the Bisso doctrine applies in that setting.  In this case, the 
strength of Bisso would be enough to overcome the FSC because the 
parties would not have a justified expectation in enforcement of a 
clause that avoids their national law.  In case of an accident taking 
place in domestic waters between international parties, the FSC should 
probably be enforceable.  Indeed, in such a case the reasonable 
expectations of the parties are that an accident could occur anywhere, 
and they want to have the certainty of a chosen forum.  The likelihood 
that they are trying to avoid the Bisso doctrine is small because they are 
not American (they may not even be aware of the doctrine) and because 
the possibility of an accident in American waters is remote.  As this 
example shows, use of the contractual public policy framework should 
greatly reduce uncertainty in the enforcement of FSCs. 
D. FSCS BETWEEN COMMERCIAL PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSACTIONS SHOULD NOT BE UNENFORCEABLE ON THE GROUNDS OF 
UNFAIRNESS OR OVERWHELMING BARGAINING POWER 
As discussed in Part I, it is unclear whether a court may declare a 
FSC unenforceable either because of unfairness or overwhelming 
bargaining power.  Courts should eliminate these standards for 
determining the validity of FSCs.  Fairness and overwhelming 
bargaining power have no place in evaluating international commercial 
contracts. 
With regard to fairness, commercial parties are perfectly capable 
of determining what is fair to them in the context of their contractual 
                                                 
259  See supra text accompanying note 91.  
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relationship, and they are in a much better position than a court to do so 
because they are more knowledgeable than the court about their overall 
commercial circumstances.  Further, imposing a standard of fairness on 
FSCs may often produce unfairness because it creates an issue for 
litigation that a party can use to delay or perhaps even avoid having a 
case decided by any tribunal.
260
  
With regard to overwhelming bargaining power, in an 
international commercial contract a party is unlikely to be the victim of 
overwhelming bargaining power if for no other reason than the fact that 
the party can walk away from the deal.  Further, if because of the need 
for a particular product a seller is able to force contractual terms, 
including a FSC, on a buyer, the buyer may well be entitled to relief 
from the entire contract because of economic duress.  To avoid the 
application of a FSC, however, the party would have to demonstrate 
that the FSC itself is affected by economic duress.  If the party only 
claims that the contract as a whole is effected by economic duress, the 




E. FSCS SHOULD BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF THE 
CHOSEN COURT 
Even if, as we said in Part I, it is reasonably certain that federal 
law (and not state law) governs the enforceability of a FSC, confusion 
still exists under federal law as to what law should govern the 
interpretation of a FSC, whether the law of the forum state or the law 
of the chosen court.  The decisions of the district court and of the Tenth 
Circuit in Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., illustrate the confusion.
262
  Plaintiff 
Yavuz, a Turkish citizen, claimed that various Swiss, American, and 
Panamanian defendants defrauded him of money used to purchase 
                                                 
260  See Clarke, supra note 250.  
261  See Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519 n. 14. 
In The Bremen, we noted that forum-selection clauses “should be given 
full effect” when “a freely negotiated private international agreement [is] 
unaffected by fraud . . . .”  Bremen, 407 U.S. at 13, 12.  This qualification does 
not mean that any time a dispute arising out of a transaction is based upon an 
allegation of fraud, as in this case, the clause is unenforceable.  Rather, it means 
that an arbitration or forum selection clause in a contract is not enforceable if 
the inclusion of that clause in the contract was the product of fraud or coercion.  
Cf. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  
See also Muzumdar v. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd., 438 F.3d 759, 762 
(7th Cir. 2006); Marra v. Papandreou, 216 F.3d 1119, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
262  Yavuz v. 61 MM, Ltd., 465 F.3d 418 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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property in Tulsa, Oklahoma.
263
  Relying on a Swiss FSC in a master 
agreement among the parties, the defendants contended that the case 
should be litigated in Switzerland.
264
  The agreement contained the 
following FSC: “Place of courts is Fribourg.”265  The agreement also 
contained a Swiss choice of law clause but it was unclear whether that 
clause applied to the FSC. The district court agreed with the defendants 
and dismissed the suit, although the basis of its decision was somewhat 
unclear.
266
  Yavuz appealed and the Tenth Circuit Court reversed 
finding that Swiss law governed and that the case should be remanded 
to the district court “to permit the parties to present the applicable law 
and perhaps to develop further any facts that may be relevant under that 
law.”267  The court also indicated that the choice of law issue might be 
moot depending on the lower court’s forum non conveniens analysis.268 
On remand, the district court again dismissed the case under a 
forum non conveniens doctrine. On further appeal by Yavuz, the Court 
of Appeals affirmed the dismissal and held that “Switzerland is the 
more convenient forum for this dispute.”269  The lengthy proceedings in 
the case show the uncertainty and cost that result when FSC are not 
treated with sufficient sanctity.    
The Fourth Circuit’s 2010 decision in Albemarle Corp. v 
AstraZeneca UK Ltd., may be a step in the right direction in reducing 
the uncertainty regarding the law applicable to FSCs, but it does not 
completely solve the problem.
270
  In 2005, AstraZeneca UK Ltd. 
(“AstraZeneca”) and Albemarle Corp. (“Albemarle”) entered into a 
contract (“2005 Contract”) according to which AstraZeneca would 
purchase 80% of its requirements of di-isopropyl-phenol (DIP) from 
Albemarle International Corporation, a Virginia corporation of the 
Albemarle group.
271
  AstraZeneca used DIP in the manufacturing of a 
branded drug named Diprivan.  In the same contract, AstraZeneca 
agreed to grant Albemarle a right of first refusal to supply propofol (a 
derivative of DIP) in case AstraZeneca decided to shift from DIP to 
propofol in the manufacture of Diprivan.  In 2006 AstraZeneca did in 
fact opt for propofol.  Alleging a breach of its right of first refusal, 
                                                 
263  Id. at 421-24. 
264  Id. at 424-25.  
265  Id. at 422-23. 
266  Id. at 424-27.  
267  Id. at 431. 
268  Id. 
269  Id. at 1169. 
270  Albemarle, 628 F.3d 643. 
271  Id. at 646. 
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Albemarle commenced an action against AstraZeneca in the Court of 
Common Pleas in Orangeburg, South Carolina.
272
  
After removing the case to federal court on diversity grounds, 
AstraZeneca filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue based on the 
choice of law and the FSC contained in the 2005 Contract.  The clause 
provided that the contract “shall be subject to English Law and the 
jurisdiction of the English High Court.”  Albemarle contended that the 
FSC was only permissive and not exclusive.  Albemarle also filed a 
motion to enjoin AstraZeneca from litigating in England.
273
  The 
district court initially denied AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss; it found 
that federal law applied in construing the FSC and therefore the 
selection was only permissive.
274
  On a motion to reconsider by 
AstraZeneca, the court vacated its earlier decision.
275
  The court 
concluded that English law controlled the interpretation of the clause, 
and under English law the clause was treated as exclusive.
276
  
Albemarle appealed the order to dismiss. The Fourth Circuit 
affirmed.
277
  The Fourth Circuit recognized that federal law controls the 
enforceability and interpretation of FSCs.
278
  Before deciding whether a 
FSC is enforceable, the court must first interpret the clause.  In the 
interpretation of the clause, the Fourth Circuit found determinative that 
the FSC in the 2005 Contract did not stand alone, but was instead 
coupled with a choice of law clause.  While the language of the FSC 
taken out of context appeared to make the clause permissive, the clause 
taken in the context of the choice of law clause “does contain what 
amounts, in effect, to language of exclusion.”279  In Albemarle, unlike 
                                                 
272  Id. at 645. 
273 Id. at 646 (“While this litigation was pending, AstraZeneca and 
Albemarle entered into a new contract dated June 23, 2008, under which 
AstraZeneca agreed to a one-time purchase of DIP from Albemarle [“2008 
Contract”].  In this contract, the parties agreed to apply South Carolina law and 
to litigate exclusively in South Carolina.”).  
274 Id. at 646-47. 
275 Id.  
276 Id. at 647.  The court also held that enforcing the forum selection 
clause would not violate any strong public policy of South Carolina.  In 
addition, on a motion for reconsideration by Albemarle, the Court found that 
the 2008 Contract (with its South Carolina choice of law) did not supersede the 
2005 Contract. 
277 Id. at 653-54. 
278 Id. at 650.  
279 Id. at 651.  The Court begins by remembering the principle laid down 
by the US Supreme Court in Bremen that contractual choice of law or choice of 
forum clauses must not be disturbed unless they are unreasonable.  The Fourth 
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Albemarle can be seen as a step in the right direction with regard 
to the enforceability of FSCs, but it can also be read as limiting the 
enforceability of such clauses.  Suppose, unlike the facts in Albemarle, 
but like the situation in Yavuz, the contract has a choice of forum clause 
but not a choice of law clause.  In that case the Fourth Circuit’s 
decision could be read to mean that the clause should be interpreted 
under U.S. law to be permissive rather than exclusive, because it would 
not have “language of exclusion.”281  
With regard to the issue of which law governs the interpretation 
of a FSC, two policies are important:  fairness and efficiency.  Freedom 
of contract is a fundamental aspect of fairness because a negotiated 
bargain represents what the parties themselves considered to be a fair 
agreement.  Pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract, courts 
should attempt to carry out the reasonable expectations of the parties.  
                                                                                                 
Circuit noted that since 1972, the Supreme Court had rejected the traditional 
refusal of American courts to enforce FSC based on the argument that they 
would be against public policy (as ousting of the jurisdiction of the court) and 
that the principle laid down in Bremen  (prima facie enforceability of a 
reasonable FSC) was now federal common law.  Under federal common law, 
when a court interprets a FSC, it must “give effect to the parties’ agreement.”  
Id. at 650.  Because the parties had agreed that the 2005 Contract “shall be 
subject to English Law,” English law has to be used to construe the FSC.  As 
the parties have stipulated, and as the English High Court has held in 
interpreting the same 2005 Contract, according to English law, the FSC must 
be interpreted as exclusive.  Id. passim. 
280 Id. at 651 (“[I]n this case the clause taken in context does contain what 
amounts, in effect, to language of exclusion.  The clause here includes language 
that English law, not American federal law, must be applied. . . . And applying 
English law makes a difference, as the parties have recognized and stipulated.  
Under English law, when the parties designate the English High Court as an 
appropriate forum, the designation is mandatory and exclusive.”) (citation 
omitted).  The decision of the Fourth Circuit was important for AstraZeneca 
because of the result that it in the meantime obtained in England.  In May 2010, 
the English High Court held that it had jurisdiction over AstraZeneca’s claims 
and that, while “the duress and conspiracy claims should be stayed in the light 
of the South Carolina court exclusive jurisdiction clause in the 2008 
Agreement, the contract claims on the 2005 Contract should go to trial in 
England.  See AstraZeneca UK Ltd. v. Albemarle Int’l Corp., [2010] EWHC 
(Comm) 1028, available at http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/ 
2010/1028.html. For subsequent proceeding in the case in England, see 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2011/1574.html. 
281  Albemarle, 628 F.3d at 651.  
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If the parties have chosen a particular forum for resolution of a dispute, 
it is more probable than not that the parties intended the law of that 
jurisdiction to govern the interpretation of the contract.  If the parties 
had intended for other law to govern, then probably they would have 
said so.  
Efficiency also supports the view that the law governing the 
enforceability of the clause should be the law of chosen jurisdiction.  
Such a rule would increase certainty with regard to FSCs and should 
reduce litigation expense.  
F. COURTS SHOULD INTERPRET FSCS AS EXCLUSIVE RATHER THAN 
PERMISSIVE ABSENT A CLEAR MANIFESTATION OF INTENT TO BE 
PERMISSIVE 
As Albemarle shows, the prevailing view in the U.S. is that in 
case of ambiguity FSCs are interpreted to be permissive rather than 
exclusive.  As a matter of policy, this view is unsound.  We urge the 
Supreme Court to rule against the presumption in favor of 
permissiveness because policy considerations of fairness, efficiency, 
historical development of FSCs, and international uniformity support 
such a change.  Indeed, to the extent that courts in other countries adopt 
a permissive interpretation, they also should change that approach.   
The arguments for interpreting FSCs as exclusive rather than 
permissive are essentially the same as those already made above with 
regard to choice of law in interpreting FSCs.  
Freedom of contract is a fundamental aspect of fairness because a 
negotiated bargain represents what the parties themselves considered to 
be a fair agreement.  Pursuant to the principle of freedom of contract, 
courts should attempt to carry out the reasonable expectations of the 
parties.  If the parties have chosen a particular forum for resolution of 
their dispute, it is more probable than not that the parties intended that 
forum to be exclusive.  If the parties had intended the forum to be 
merely permissive, they would likely have said so or drafted the clause 
as a consent to jurisdiction rather than a FSC.
282
  
When the parties insert a FSC in a contract, they almost certainly 
had in mind to exclusively establish the forum where possible 
controversies, if any, should be resolved.  It is also probable that the 
                                                 
282  A consent-to-jurisdiction clause has the purpose of consenting to the 
personal jurisdiction of a certain court over both parties.  The language can be, 
for example, the following:  “The Parties hereby consent to the jurisdiction of 
courts of the State of New York.” 
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parties took this element into account when negotiating the economics 
of the agreement.
283
  Indeed, a claim is not an infrequent occurrence in 
commercial transactions and legal fees and court costs sensibly vary 
from one place to another.  Besides, it is often true that insurance 
policies cover the litigation in one place but do not cover it in another.  
The party whose home court has not been chosen, has freely 
entered into the agreement and has conceivably benefited in terms of a 
reduced price or better conditions.  When a claim arises, this party 
might regret having accepted a foreign jurisdiction and—ignoring the 
FSC—try to bring the claim in his or her home court.284  To allow this 
afterthought of a party is quite unfair toward the other party.  Had the 
other party known of the possibility of being sued in a different tribunal 




Efficiency also supports the view that in case of ambiguity FSCs 
should be interpreted to be exclusive.  Such a rule would increase 
certainty with regard to FSCs and should reduce litigation expense.  
Indeed, the exclusivity rule avoids possible multiplication of fora (like 
in Albemarle),
286
 i.e., the situation in which every party has claims and 
                                                 
283  See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 14 (“[I]t would be unrealistic to think that the 
parties did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms 
[taking into account the FSC].”); See also Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 
594 (when speaking of “reduced fares” for passengers). 
284  One cannot reject the possibility of a home-town advantage out of 
hand.  There is evidence that it exists, even in United States Federal Courts. 
Questions of fact and degree arise.  However, where two arms length 
commercial parties of more or less equal bargaining power, in which I do not 
include government controlled corporations, do agree on an exclusive choice of 
court clause, it can reasonably be assumed that they are satisfied that neither 
party will obtain any such advantage.  Governments should respect such a 
choice.  See Spigelman, supra note 143, at 25.  The party whose home-town 
has not been chosen, should a claim arise, may lose the “home-town 
advantage” (if a home-town advantage she would have in her jurisdiction); but 
for the sake of commerce and in the perspective of freedom of contract to 
which international treaties and western economies are both imprinted, why 
should the parties’ contractual intent not be respected?    
285  There might be parties—especially if unrepresented by a lawyer—that 
were unaware that an exclusive FSC bars the possibility of suing elsewhere.  
These parties, however, make a choice:  they chose to enter into an agreement 
without legal advice.  The choice might have been based on cost saving.  Once 
a claim arises, it is fundamentally unfair to allow parties to sue in a different 
forum, alleging their own ignorance of the consequences of a FSC. 
286  Albemarle, 628 F.3d 643. 
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presents them to different tribunals.   
In economic terms, the exclusivity rule has the ability to reduce 
transactional costs associated with international contracts, by 
potentially reducing the “[r]isks arising from unfamiliarity with foreign 
legal process” and the “[r]isks arising from unknown and unpredictable 
legal exposure.”287  The way in which the interpretation as “exclusive” 
diminishes the transaction costs is by increasing certainty.  If parties 
cannot be sure where they can be sued they obviously take this 
uncertainty in account in the negotiation of the agreement.  The 
decrease of transaction costs would be an advantage for the competition 
of American companies in the worldwide market.
288
      
In addition, reasons of both history and international uniformity 
support the view that FSCs should be interpreted as exclusive.  The 
presumption in favor of interpreting FSCs to be permissive is a relic of 
a past in which FSCs were disfavored because they ousted the courts of 
jurisdiction.  As Bremen and Carnival Cruise clearly show, judicial 
disfavor of FSCs is no longer the case.  Therefore, historical 
development favors a shift from a presumption in favor of interpreting 
a FSC as permissive to a presumption in favor of finding such a clause 
to be exclusive.   
International uniformity also supports a shift from a presumption 
of permissiveness to one of exclusivity.  In the European Union, 
exclusivity is the rule.
289
  The Hague Convention adopts a presumption 
in favor of exclusivity.
290
  Exclusivity is the rule in arbitration.
291
  As 
discussed above, the law governing arbitration and FSCs is slowly 
converging.  Uniformity between these two methods of dispute 
resolution also supports a shift from a presumption that such clauses are 
permissive to one of exclusivity.     
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 In Bremen, the Supreme Court reversed the historical judicial 
antagonism to FSC and established a strong presumption in favor of the 
enforceability of such clauses.  However, Bremen included a number of 
                                                 
287  Spigelman, supra note 143, at 7. 
288  This is one of the Supreme Court‘s concerns in Bremen. See Bremen, 
407 U.S. at 9.      
289  See Volner, supra note 136. 
290  See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text. 
291  See supra notes 216-26 and accompanying text. 
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possible limitations on the enforceability of FSC, especially the 
requirement of reasonableness, that create uncertainty (and basis for 
litigation) about such clauses.  This article has argued that the Court 
should abandon these limitations in enforcing FSC in international 
commercial contracts.  Instead, such clauses should be subject to the 
general standards for enforceability of any contract.  Reasons of 
freedom of contract, economic efficiency, history, and international 
uniformity support this change in the law.   
While the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 
resolves many issues associated with the enforceability of FSCs, the 
ratification of the Convention by the United States will leave a number 
of questions unanswered.  The grounds for unenforceability of a FSC 
under the Convention are quite broad and ill-defined.  Moreover, many 
international commercial contracts are not subject to the Hague 
Convention.  General principles of U.S. law regarding FSCs will 
continue to apply to these contracts. 
If the Hague Convention goes into effect, courts will have an 
opportunity to reexamine the grounds for refusing to enforce a FSC.  
The argument of this paper—that grounds for refusing to enforce FSC 
should be limited to ordinary contract grounds, excluding 
reasonableness, unfairness, and inconvenience—is therefore 
particularly timely and important at this moment before the Convention 
takes effect. 
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